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This dissertation takes two approaches  martingale and backward stochastic dieren-
tial equation (BSDE)  to solve non-zero-sum stochastic dierential games in which all
players can control and stop the reward streams of the games. Existence of equilibrium
stopping rules is proved under some assumptions.
The martingale part provides an equivalent martingale characterization of Nash equilib-
rium strategies of the games. When using equilibrium stopping rules, Isaacs' condition
is necessary and sucient for the existence of an equilibrium control set.
The BSDE part shows that solutions to BSDEs provide value processes of the games.
A multidimensional BSDE with reecting barrier is studied in two cases for its solu-
tion: existence and uniqueness with Lipschitz growth, and existence in a Markovian
system with linear growth rate.
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Game theory is deeply rooted in history, beneting since ancient times, yet human be-
ings did not seem to have mathematically brought it to any higher level until the early
twentieth century. Despite the Nobel prize for John Nash's Nash equilibrium, among
other Nobel Laureates on game theory, twentieth century achievements on non-zero-
sum games were not well known to the great majority until an Oscar lm called A
Beautiful Mind was release by Universal Pictures in the year 2001. If there has to be
a simplest and most understandable example on non-zero-sum game and Nash equilib-
rium, it is the movie. The author of this dissertation was lucky enough to have heard
the following dialogue (not every word exactly recorded).
(11th March 2009, Columbia University)
Kuhn : Don't learn game theory from the movie. The blonde thing is not a Nash
equilibrium!
Odifreddi : How you invented the theory, I mean, the story about the blonde, was it
real?
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Nash : No!!!
Odifreddi : Did you apply game theory to win Alicia?
Nash : ...Yes...
(followed by 10 min's discussion on personal life and game theory)
1.1 From zero-sum to non-zero-sum games
1.1.1 Von Neumann and zero-sum games
Von Neumann moved to Princeton University in 1928, where he popularized the study
of game theory. Von Neumann and coworkers' main achievements treated games in
which one player's reward is identically the other player's loss, formally called zero-
sum games.
In a zero-sum game, there are two players I and II, whose generic strategies are re-
spectively denoted as s1 and s2. The quantity R(s1; s2) that is subject to the players'
strategies (s1; s2) is reward for Player I and cost to Player II. Simultaneously, Player
I tries to maximize the reward and Player II to minimize it. Since Player I does not
necessarily know the strategy that Player II is employing, he would maximize his re-
ward with strategy s1, assuming Player II makes it the least favorable by minimizing






for Player I is called the lower value of the zero-sum game. Symmetrically, Player
II would minimize his cost in Player I's most favorable choice, resulting in the upper








The lower value of a game is apparently no larger than the upper value. When the
two values identify with each other, they are called the value of the game. The zero-
sum game is then said to have a value. The optimal pair of strategies (s1; s

2) that
achieves the upper and the lower values is called a saddle point.
Denition 1.1.1 A saddle point (s1; s

2) of a zero-sum game is a single pair of strategies
that attains both sup inf in the lower value (1.1.1) and inf sup in the upper value (1.1.2).









R(s1; s2) = V¯ : (1.1.3)
Another denition of a saddle point (s1; s

2) concerns the stability that the optimal
strategies produce. When Player II employs strategy s2, the strategy s

1 should max-
imize the reward R over all possible strategies for Player I. When Player I employs
strategy s1, the strategy s

2 had better minimize the cost R over all possible strategies
for Player II. This way, neither Player is likely to deviate from his optimal strategy.
Denition 1.1.2 A saddle point (s1; s

2) of a zero-sum game is a pair of strategies such
that
R(s1; s2)  R(s1; s2)  R(s1; s2): (1.1.4)
The two denitions of a saddle point are equivalent. If the pair of strategies (s1; s

2)






R(s1; s2) = inf
s2
R(s1; s2)  R(s1; s2), for any s2; (1.1.5)








R(s1; s2) = sup
s1
R(s1; s2)  R(s1; s2), for any s1: (1.1.6)
Suppose (s1; s

2) satises inequality (1.1.4). Taking supremum over all admissible











R(s1; s2)  sup
s1
R(s1; s2), and infs2




















R(s1; s2)  infs2 sups1
R(s1; s2) (1.1.9)











As an example from nance, a signing contract on one contingent claim is a zero-sum
game. The writer's prot/loss is identically the buyer's loss/prot. We take a European
call option (S T  K)+ for example. At maturity time T , if the stock price $ S T is higher
than the strike price K, the contract forces the writer to sell the stock worth $ S T to the
buyer at price $ K. The buyer can sell the stock on the market at price $ S T . In this case
the dierent $ (S T   K) between market price and strike price is prot for the buyer
and missed prot for the writer. If the stock price falls below strike price at maturity,
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then the buyer does not need to take any action. From the writer's point of view, such
a contract should not be delivered for free. He charges the buyer a price $ P for the
option to buy low. When the stock price goes above strike price, the buyer wins and the
seller loses $ ((S T  K) P). When stock price goes below strike price, the buyer loses
and the seller wins $ P. How much the writer of a contract should charge the buyer is
the question answered by theories on option pricing.
1.1.2 John Nash and non-zero-sum games
Besides zero-sum games, there exist games with multiple players where the players'
rewards do not necessarily sum up to a constant. Questions of how to reach some pleas-
ant stability for all parties concerned lead to the development of non-zero-sum games.
In John Nash's 1949 one-page Nobel Prize winning paper, he wrote:
One may dene a concept of AN n-PERSON GAME in which each player has a -
nite set of pure strategies and in which a denite set of payments to the n players
corresponds to each n-tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken by each player.
One such n-tuple counters another if the strategy of each player in the countering
n-tuple yields the highest obtainable expectation for its player against the n   1 strate-
gies of the other players in the countered n-tuple. A self-countering n-tuple is called
AN EQUILIBRIUM POINT.
Translating Nash's denitions into twenty-rst century plain English: a non-zero-sum
game is the game in which each player chooses a strategy as his best response to other
players' strategies. An equilibrium is a set of strategies, such that, when applied, no
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player will prot from unilaterally changing his own strategy. Equivalently, the equilib-
rium is a xed point of the mapping from a given set of strategies to the set of strategies
as the players' best responses to the given set.
Denition 1.1.3 In a non-zero-sum game of N Players, each player, indexed by i, can
choose a strategy si. Player i receives a reward Ri(s1;    ; sN) related to the N Players'




2;    ; sN)  R1(s1; s2;    ; sN), for any s1;
R2(s1; s





2;    ; sN)  R1(s1; s2;    ; sN), for any sN :
(1.1.11)
To credit Nash's formulation, an equilibrium set of strategies as in Denition 1.1.3 is
conventionally called an Nash equilibrium. It is indeed an equilibrium, for when
imposed on all Players, no rational Player will want to change to a dierent strategy.
Nash equilibrium of a non-zero-sum game generalizes the Von Neumann-Morgenstern
notion of saddle point of a zero-sum game.
We consider the zero-sum game described in section 1.1.1, where Player I chooses
strategy s1 to maximize his reward R(s1; s2), and Player II chooses strategy s2 to min-
imize R(s1; s2) as his cost. His minimizing the cost R(s1; s2) is equivalent to Player
II's maximizing  R. We may construct a two-person non-zero-sum game with the two
players' rewards being R1(s1; s2) = R(s1; s2) and R2(s1; s2) =  R(s1; s2). When Player
II employs strategy s2, Player I's reward R
1(s1; s2) is maximized by s1 = s1 over all
possible strategies for Player I. When Player I employs strategy s1, Player II's reward
R2(s1; s2) is maximized by s2 = s2 over all possible strategies for Player II. Hence the
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saddle point (s1; s

2) of the original zero-sum game is also a Nash equilibrium of the
non-zero-sum game. The above reasoning is summarized in Table 1.1.2.
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R(s1; s2)  R(s1; s2),
R(s1; s
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 R(s1; s2) R(s1; s2)  R(s1; s2),








2)  R1(s1; s2),
R2(s1; s

2)  R2(s1; s2)
Table 1.1.2: a saddle of a zero-sum game as a special case of an equilibrium of a
non-zero-sum game.
Though it is the most popular optimality criterion for an N-player non-zero-sum game,
Nash equilibrium is not the only one. Other optimality criteria include ecient and
in the core sets of strategies.
Denition 1.1.4 A set of strategies (s1;    ; sN) is said to be ecient for the N-player
game, if for any set of strategies (s1;    ; sN), there exists some Player i, such that his
reward satises
Ri(s1;    ; sN)  Ri(s1;    ; sN): (1.1.12)
The set of strategies (s1;    ; sN) is said to be in the core, if for any index subset I 
f1;    ;Ng, there exists some Player i, such that his reward satises
Ri(s1;    ; sN)  Ri(s1;    ; sN); (1.1.13)
where s j = sj , for all j not in the subset I.
The above denition can be found in the survey paper Davis (1973) [11]. Ecient
strategies cannot be modied to improve every player's situation. A set of strategies is
in the core, if coalition within any lot cannot improve the situation of everyone in the
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lot while strategies of players outside of this lot remain the same. Strategies in the core
are both Nash and ecient. Nash equilibrium and eciency do not cover each other.
This dissertation will focus on Nash equilibrium.
1.1.3 Popular approaches to stochastic dierential games
Stochastic dierential games are a family of dynamic, continuous time versions of
games incorporating randomness in both the states and the rewards. The states are ran-
dom, described by an adapted diusion process whose dynamics are known. To play
a game, a player receives a running reward cumulated at some rate till the end of the
game and a terminal reward granted at the end of the game. The rewards are related
to both the state process and the controls at the choice of the players, as deterministic
or random functions or functionals of them. A control represents a player's action in
attempt to inuence his rewards. Assuming his rationality, a player should certainly act
in the most protable way to his knowledge. Since the rewards can be random, they
are usually measured in the expectation, or some other more sophisticated criteria, for
example in the variance as a measure of risk.
Depending on dierent settings, a game could never end, end at a nite determinis-
tic time, or end at a random time. When the game is terminated at a random time, the
random time is usually a stopping time, meaning up to any deterministic time, a player
is informed enough to decide if he is to quit the game or not. One case of interest is to
quit when a diusion as the state process hits the boundary of some nite open domain,
so that the associated PDE for the player's value function has a nite state space. The
other case is to let a player determine the time to quit the game, based on his informa-
tion up-to-date about the state process, about his own rewards, and even about other
players' actions. In the latter case, a player is again assumed rational, seeking the best
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reward possible.
In a zero-sum game of timing, one player chooses a stopping time to maximize his
reward received from the other player, and the other player chooses another stopping
time to minimize the rst player's reward as cost to him. Such a zero-sum game of
stopping is called a Dynkin game. It is the two-player game version of the op-
timal stopping problem, in practice the optimal exercise of an American contingent
claim. Dynkin games are connected to singular controls, in the sense that, for convex
cost functions, value function of the former games are derivatives of value functions
of the latter. This connection was rst observed by Taksar (1985) [49], followed by
Fukushima and Taksar (2002) [25] in a Markovian setting by solving free-boundary
problems, and Karatzas and Wang (2001) [37] in a non-Markovian setting based on
weak compactness arguments.
In the literatures on both zero-sum and non-zero-sum stochastic dierential games of
control, the existence and the choice of optimal controls are shown to be equivalent to
the existence of controls that satisfy the Isaacs' conditions, which is the achievability of
the maximum or maxima of the associated Hamiltonians. In zero-sum games, one may
prove such achievability by an optimal control with measurable selection techniques,
for example, in Benes (1970) [1]. While in N-player non-zero-sum games, the Isaacs'
condition, or Nash condition, does not always hold true. The existence of an optimal
control set that maximizes the Hamiltonians serves as an easy-to-verify local condition
equivalent to the existence of equilibrium controls. More detailed discussions can be
found in Davis (1979) [12].
Due to the nature of the problem, there have been at least three major approaches
to solving stochastic dierential games - partial dierential equations, martingale tech-
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niques, and backward stochastic dierential equations.
With Markovian rewards, which are functions of the current value of an underling dif-
fusion state process, partial dierential equations are a handy tool. Over the past thirty
years, Bensoussan, Frehse and Friedman built a regularity theory of PDE's to study
stochastic dierential games. Among their extensive works, Bensoussan and Friedman
(1977) considered in [6] games of optimal stopping. The existence of optimal stopping
times of such games is reduced to the study of regular solutions of quasi-variational
inequalities, assuming continuous and bounded running rewards and terminal rewards;
Bensoussan and Frehse (2000) in [4] solved a non-zero-sum game of optimal controls,
which is terminated when the state process exits a bounded domain. Their running
rewards are quadratic forms of the controls. Fleming and Soner (1993) [23] give a full
account of controlled Markov diusions.
Under some regularity conditions and with uniqueness of solution in some sense, the
HJB PDEs can be numerically implemented using the nite dierence method. Due
(2006) [15] is a good manual of nite dierence methods for nancial computations.
The martingale approach to characterizing optimal controls dates back to 1970's. The
idea is exactly the one to derive Verication Theorems and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations: the expected reward is a supermartingale, and it is a martingale if and only
if the control is optimal. The martingale approach allows the rewards to be path-
dependent on the state process. Among others, there was a line of early works dealing
with path-dependent rewards developing from optimization, through zero-sum games,
and to non-zero-sum games, by Benes (1970) [1] and (1971) [2], Duncan and Varaiya
(1971) [16], Davis and Varaiya (1973) [13] and Davis (1973) [11]. The work Davis
(1979) [12] is a survey on the martingale method for optimal control problems.
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To accommodate path-dependent rewards in games of stopping, Snell envelopes named
after J. L. Snell for his 1952 work [48], instead of stopping regions for Markovian re-
wards (c.f. Shiryayev (1979) [47]), are used to derive optimal stopping rules. The Snell
envelope is the smallest supermartingale dominating the rewards, and is a martingale if
stopped at the optimal stopping time. It is optimal to stop when, for the rst time, ter-
minal reward granted for early exercise meets the best expected reward over all possible
stopping times. The martingale method also facilitates the study of zero-sum and non-
zero-sum games of control and stopping, and is particularly useful in characterizing
the semimartingale structure of the players' value processes. When there are terminal
rewards only, Lepeltier and Etourneau (1987) in [41] used martingale techniques to
provide sucient conditions for the existence of optimal stopping times on processes
that need not be Markovian. Their general theory requires some order assumption and
supermartingale assumptions on the terminal reward. Karatzas and Zamrescu (2008)
in [39] took the martingale approach to characterize, then construct saddle points for
zero-sum games of control and stopping. They also characterized the value processes
by the semimartingale decompositions and proved a stochastic maximum principle for
continuous, bounded running reward that can be a functional of the diusion state pro-
cess.
The martingale approach is very intuitive, revealing the nature of the optimization prob-
lems.
As a tool for stochastic control theory, backward stochastic dierential equations (BS-
DEs for short) were rst proposed by Bismut in the 1970's. Pardoux and Peng (1990)
proved in [45] existence and uniqueness of the solution to a BSDE with uniformly Lip-
schitz growth. El Karoui, Peng and Quenez (1997) [20] is a survey on BSDEs and their
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nancial applications. Considerable attention has been devoted to studying the associ-
ation between BSDEs and stochastic dierential games. Cvitanic´ and Karatzas (1996)
proved in [10] existence and uniqueness of the solution to the equation with double
reecting barriers, and associated their BSDE to a zero-sum Dynkin game. Their work
generalized El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez (1997) [19] on one-
dimensional BSDE with one reecting boundary, which captures early stopping fea-
tures as that of American options. Hamadene and Lepeltier (2000) [29] and Hamadene
(2006) [30] added controls to the Dynkin game studied by Cvitanic´ and Karatzas (1996)
[10], the tool still being BSDE with double reecting barriers. Markovian rewards of
games correspond to the equations in the Markovian framework. Hamadene studied
in [27] and [28] Nash equilibrium control with forward-backward SDE. In Hamadene,
Lepeltier and Peng (1997) [26], the growth rates of their forward-backward SDE are
linear in the value process and the volatility process, and polynomial in the state pro-
cess. Their state process is a diusion satisfying an L2-dominance condition. These
three authors solve a non-zero-sum game without stopping, based on existence result
of the multi-dimensional BSDE.
BSDEs are, after all, as much of an analytical tool as probabilistic. The opportunity to
use heavy analysis is an advantage of the BSDE approach, for it facilitates solving the
optimization problems under looser technical conditions. There have also been plenty
of works on numerical solutions to BSDEs.
Readers interested in numerical methods for stochastic dierential games are referred
to works by H.J. Kushner and P. Dupuis.
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1.2 Martingale techniques
In the stochastic dierential game, Problem 2.1.1, to be formulated in Chapter 2, a
representative ith Player faces the optimization problem with expected reward
Jt(; u) := Eu[Rt(; u)jFt]; (1.2.1)
when all other Players' strategies are given. To simplify notation, this is a typical
question of nding a stopping rule  and control u to maximize the one-dimensional
expected reward (2.2.1) over all stopping rules  2 S (t;T ) and all admissible controls




h(s; X; us)ds + L()1f<T g + 1f=T g; (1.2.2)
Throughout this section, notations like J, R, h, L, and  are one-dimensional.
Classical martingale characterization of the optimization problem views optimal stop-
ping and optimal control separately.
For every xed admissible control u, denote





h(s; X; us)ds: (1.2.3)
It is optimal to stop the rst time when Q(; u) meets R0(; u). The stopped supermartin-
gale Q( ^ ; u) is a Pu-supermartingale with respect to fFtg0t, and is a martingale
if and only if  is optimal. Q(; u) is called the Snell envelope of R0(; u). Optimal
stopping theory using Snell envelope does not require the reward to be Markovian in
the state process X.
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For every xed stopping time , denote













V(; u) is a Pu-supermartingale with respect to fFtg0t, for every u, and is a martingale
if and only if u is optimal.
Once obtaining the supermartingale property of V(; u), with the help of Doob-Meyer
decomposition of super(sub)martingales, we can decompose
V(; u) = V(0; u) + M(; u)   A(; u) (1.2.5)
as summation of a Pu-martingale M and decreasing process  A. A martingale represen-
tation theorem further represents M(; u) = R t0 (Zus )0dBus as a stochastic integral integral
with respect to to the Pu-standard Brownian motion Bu. It turns out that Zu = Z does
not depend on u. A(; u) can be shown to satisfy
A(t; u)   A(t; v) =  
Z t
0
(H(s; X;Zs; us)   H(s; X;Zs; vs))ds, 0  t  ; (1.2.6)
for any controls u; v 2 U . The function or functional H is the Hamiltonian dened as
H(t; X; z; u) := z 1(t; X) f (t; X; u) + h(t; X; u): (1.2.7)
Derived from the martingale property of the optimal control u, locally maximizing the
Hamiltonian H at every time and scenario is equivalent to to globally maximizing the
expected reward over the entire duration of the game and the entire probability space.
The existence of a control u that maximizes the Hamiltonian is called Isaacs' condi-
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tion. Necessity of Isaacs' condition for maximizing the expected reward is called
the stochastic maximum principle.
For these martingale theorems to apply, most works so far assume boundedness of
the rewards as a technical assumption, though the general belief is that the bounded-
ness assumption can be relaxed. The arguments in the survey article Davis (1979) [12]
indeed proceed as well if the rewards have at most polynomial growth in the supremum
of the historical path of the state process.
Readers are referred to Karatzas and Shreve (1998) [35] for Snell envelopes of optimal
stopping problems, to Karatzas and Shreve (1988) [34] and Revuz and Yor (1999) [46]
for Brownian motion and continuous time martingales.
1.2.1 Snell envelope




E[RjFt], 0  t  T: (1.2.8)
The terminal time T is nite. The ltration fFtg0tT satises the usual condition. The
process fRtg0tT is interpreted as a player's reward at every time t. The value process
Y is the best expected reward possible the player could get by choosing to stop between
current time t and terminal time T . If assuming R is bounded from below and right-
continuous, then Y has an RCLL modication which shall still be denoted by the same
symbol. The process Y is the smallest RCLL supermartingale dominating R. To credit
Snell's contribution to solving this optimal stopping problem, Y is called the Snell
envelope of R. If further more assuming E[ sup
stT
RsjFt] < 1, the optimal stopping rule
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is
 = infft  s  T jRs = Ysg; (1.2.9)
the rst time reward process R meets value process Y from below.
See Appendix D, Karatzas and Shreve (1998) [35] for detailed expositions of Snell
envelope.
1.2.2 Doob-Meyer decomposition
The sum of a martingale and predictable, increasing (decreasing) process with respect
to the same ltration is a supermartingale (submartingale). Whether the reverse claim
is true or not raises the question of supermartingale (submartingale) decomposition.
For discrete time martingale, the answer is simple, for the two summands have been
explicitly constructed.
Theorem 1.2.1 (Doob decomposition) Any submartingale Y = fYn;Fngn=0;1; can be
uniquely decomposed as
Yn = Mn + An; (1.2.10)
the summation of a martingale M = fMn;Fngn=0;1; and an predictable, increasing
sequence A = fAn;Fngn=0;1;.
Proof. Taking A0 = 0, and An+1 = An   Yn + E[Yn+1jFn] =
nP
k=0
E([Yk+1jFk]   Yk). 
In continuous time, there has not been any analogue construction of the increasing
(decreasing) process. A natural resort would be approximating continuous time mar-
tingales using the discrete time result. To show convergence of the approximating se-
quence of discrete time monotonic processes, additional assumptions are required. A
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most commonly used condition is a right-continuous supermartingale (submartingale)
of class DL or class D .
Denition 1.2.1 The collection of all stopping times  bounded between 0 and a -
nite positive number T (respectively, innity) is denoted as S0;T (S0;1). A right-
continuous process fYt;Ftgt0 is said to be of class D , if the family fYg2S0;1 is uni-
formly integrable; of class DL , if the family fYg2S0;T is uniformly integrable, for
every 0  T  1.
Theorem 1.2.2 (Doob-Meyer decomposition) Let a ltration fFtgt0 be right-continuous
and such thatF0 contains all P-negligible sets inF . If a right-continuous submartin-
gale Y = fYt;Ftgt0 is of class DL , then it admits the decomposition
Yt = Mt + At, t  0; (1.2.11)
as the summation of a right-continuous martingale M = fMt;Ftgt0 and a predictable,
increasing process A = fAt;Ftgt0. Under the condition of predictability of process A,
the decomposition is unique. Further, if Y is of classD , the M is a uniformly integrable
martingale and A is integrable.
Without the assumption of class DL , the decomposition is also valid, but M being
only a local martingale is the price to pay.
1.2.3 Martingale representation theorems
The Ito integral of an adapted, square-integrable process with respect to Brownian mo-
tion is a local martingale. Conversely, is a (local) martingale fM; fFtgg a stochastic
integral of some adapted, square-integrable process with respect to a certain Brownian
motion? The answer is given by the martingale representation theorems.
1.2. MARTINGALE TECHNIQUES 19
In 1953, J. L. Doob answered yes. If M is a d-dimensional continuous local mar-
tingale on the ltered probability space (
;F ;P) with ltration fFtg, then one can
construct, on a possibly extended ( 
; F ; P) with a possibly extended ltration f Ftg,
a d-dimensional Brownian motion W, and a d  d matrix Z of measurable, adapted,





as the stochastic integral of Z with respect to the Brownian motion W, which is not
prexed. The Brownian motion W is constructed according to the local martingale M.
Since the the original probability space (
;F ;P) might not be enough to support the
Brownian motion required for the representation, an extension might be necessary.
Preferrably, we would like all martingales on the same ltered probability space be
stochastic integrals with respect to one single Brownian motion. This is true if the
(augmented) ltration is Brownian. If M is a d-dimensional RCLL, square-integrable
martingale on the ltered probability space (
;F ;P) with (augmented) ltration fFtg
generated by a Brownian motion B, then there exists a d  d matrix Z of measurable,





The Brownian motion B is the same for all P-martingales on fFtg. It is the given Brow-
nian motion that generate fFtg.
In the setting of Chapter 2, we need to represent the martingale part M(; u) of the value
process V(; u) in (1.2.5) to solve the optimization problem. M(; u) is a Pu-martingale
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for some Pu-standard Brownian motion Bu. This has been conrmed with (Theorem
3.1, Fujisaki, Kallianpur and Kunita (1972) [24]). Their result is not covered by the
previous two representation theorems, because the Brownian motion Bu is the prexed
drifted P-B.M. and standard Pu-B.M. dened in (3.1.10), and fFtg is not necessarily
generated by Bu due to randomness in the drift coecient.
1.3 Backward stochastic dierential equations
Backward stochastic dierential equations were proposed for the rst time in Bismut
(1973) [7] as means to solve linear stochastic optimal control problems. The two sub-
jects agree in terms of seeking adapted strategies to achieve a terminal goal. In the
setting of Chapter 3, the value process in a solution to a BSDE turns out to provide
the value process of a control problem, the proof of which requires boundedness of the
rewards in most previous works. The terminal reward of the control problem corre-
sponds to the terminal value of the equation, the Hamiltonian corresponds to the driver
of the equation, and the early exercise rewards corresponds to the reecting boundaries.
Once a backward equation is introduced, not only probabilistic tools but also analyti-
cal techniques can be applied. This BSDE approach oers more exibility, though is
somewhat less intuitive than the martingale approach. The connection between BSDEs
and stochastic optimization problems can be viewed as a stochastic version of the ver-
ication theorem that links PDEs to control of Diusions.
We will focus on how dierent types of BSDEs are connected to various optimal con-
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trol and stopping problems, as summarized in tables (1.1) and (1.2) below.
Table 1.1: correspondence between types of stochastic dierential games and types of
BSDEs.
Game BSDE
one person's optimal control 1-dim, no reection
zero-sum game of control 1-dim, no reection
one person's optimal stopping 1-dim, lower reecting boundary
Dynkin game
(zero-sum game of stopping) 1-dim, double reecting boundary
N-player non-zero-sum game of control N-dim, no reection
risk-sensitive control quadratic driver
Table 1.2: correspondence between parameters of stochastic dierential games and
parameters of BSDEs.
Game BSDE
number of rewards to optimize dimension
value process value process
Hamiltonian driver
maximum duration of game terminal time
terminal reward terminal value
early exercise reward reecting boundary
regret from suboptimal exercise time the increasing process
Brownian noise from state process Brownian noise added to the equation
instantaneous volatility of value process volatility process
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1.3.1 Birth of BSDE
A control problem with the expected reward
Jt(u; v) = Eu;v[
Z T
t
h(s; X; us; vs)ds + jFt] (1.3.1)
identies with BSDE
Yu;v(t) =  +
Z T
t




in the sense that the value process Yu;v among any solution (Yu;v;Zu;v) to the BSDE
(1.3.2) equals the value process J(u; v) of the control problem (1.3.1). For the control
problem, h is an instantaneous reward rate, and  is the xed terminal reward at time
T . The Hamiltonian H is dened as
H(t; X; z; u; v) := z 1(t; X) f (t; X; u; v) + h(t; X; u; v): (1.3.3)
Starting from a simplied version which can be solved by martingale representation,
Pardoux and Peng (1990) [45] used Picard iteration to show existence of an adapted
solution, and similar inequalities used in the iteration to show uniqueness of such solu-
tions, to a backward equation of the general form







where the function g is uniformly Lipschitz in the Y and Z arguments. The two pa-
rameters g and  in (1.3.4) are called terminal value and driver of the BSDE. The
solution consists of value process Y and volatility process Z.
Both existence and uniqueness of the solution can alternatively be proven at the same
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time by the contraction method as in El Karoui, Peng and Quenez (1997) [20]. They
rst pick two arbitrary adapted, square-integrable processes Y0 and Z0 in the driver g
to solve the equation







for (Y1;Z1). As in Pardoux and Peng (1990) [45], the process Z1 comes from represen-











































The contraction method derives existence and uniqueness of solution to equation (1.3.4)
by proving the mapping from (Y0;Z0) to (Y1;Z1) is a contraction, thus having a unique
xed point (Y;Z). The xed point solves equation (1.3.4).
The contraction method is equivalent to Pardoux and Peng's 1990 proof. Besides mea-
surabilities and integrabilities, a crucial technical assumption of the two proofs is the
driver g being Lipschitz in both value process y and volatility process z, uniformly in
time t.
Under the assumptions above, and in dimension one, the Comparison Theorem (sec-
tion 2.2, El Karoui, Peng and Quenez (1997) [20]) states that a larger terminal value
and a larger driver will produce a larger value process of a BSDE. Conversely, that a
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larger value process has to be produced by a larger terminal value and a larger driver
is called the Converse Comparison Theorem. Briand, Coquet, Hu, Me´min and Peng
(2000) [8] proved a Converse Comparison Theorem for one-dimensional BSDE with
Lipschitz driver. Comparison Theorems and the converse, when holding true, deter-
mines a necessary and sucient condition for the optimal control(s).
An optimization problem considers one control u only and the other control v dis-









If the rewards h and  are bounded, the value process Yu of BSDE
Yu(t) =  +
Z T
t




can be shown to equal Jt(u) in (1.3.8), with Hamiltonian H dened as
H(t; X; z; u) := z 1(t; X) f (t; X; u) + h(t; X; u): (1.3.10)
When technical conditions are satised, maximizing Hamiltonian H is equivalent to
maximizing value process Yu, which equals expected reward J(u). Hence a control u
is optimal if and only if u maximizes H(t; x; z; u) among all admissible controls. Benes
(1970) [1] proved achievablity of the Hamiltonian by a measurable u.
In a zero-sum game with expected rewards (1.3.1), one player chooses control u to
maximize J(u; v), and the other player chooses control v to minimize J(u; v). A saddle
point is a pair of controls (u; v) such that
J(u; v)  J(u; v)  J(u; v): (1.3.11)
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If existing, the saddle point (u; v) attains superema and inma, and identies sup inf










With bounded rewards, if a control pair (u; v) satisfy
H(t; x; z; u; v)  H(t; x; z; u; v)  H(t; x; z; u; v); (1.3.13)
then (u; v) is a saddle point of the zero-sum game. Existence of controls that maxi-
mize or minimize the Hamiltonians in a way like (1.3.13) is called Isaacs' condition.
Necessity of Isaacs' condition is called the  Stochastic Maximum Principle. The
Comparison Theorem of BSDEs is used to derive suciency of Isaacs' condition, and
the converse Comparison Theorem for the maximum principle.
A case in optimal control that receives more special treatments is the Markovian case.
In the Markovian framework, where the state process X is the solution to a forward
SDE
Xt = X0 +
Z t
0
f (s; Xs; us)ds +
Z t
0
(s; Xs)dBus , 0  t  T; (1.3.14)
and where rewards are functions of the state process X as in
Jt(u; v) = Eu;v
"Z T
t




expected reward Jt(u; v) is a function of the time t and the current value of the state
process Xt = x.
Corresponding toMarkovian setting of a control problem, there is the forward-backward
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system of stochastic dierential equations (FBSDE)
8>>>>><>>>>>:
Xt;x(s) = x, 0  s  t;
dXt;x(s) = (s; Xt;x(s))dBs, t < s  T;
(1.3.16)
and
Y t;x(s) = (Xt;x(T )) +
Z T
s
g(r; Xt;x(r);Y t;x(r);Zt;x(r))dr  
Z T
s
Zt;x(r)dBr, t  s  T:
(1.3.17)
As an application of Ito's formula, if a function y solves the PDE
@ty(t; x) +A y(t; x) + g(t; x; y(t; x); 0(t; x)@xy(t; x)) = 0;
y(T; x) = (x);
(1.3.18)






(0)i j(t; x)@2xix j +
X
i
fi(t; x)@xi ; (1.3.19)
then
(Y t;x ; Z
t;x
 ) = (y(; Xt;x ); 0(t; Xt;x )@xy(; Xt;x )) (1.3.20)
solves the forward-backward system (1.3.16) and (1.3.17).
PDE (1.3.18) is the renowned Feynman-Kac formula that reveals the connection be-
tween PDEs and probability theory.
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1.3.2 The role of reecting boundaries





h(s; X)ds + L()1f<T g + 1f=T g
Ft# : (1.3.21)
In addition to running reward accumulated at rate h, if a player sticks to the end of the
game, he receives a terminal reward ; if he decides to quit at any earlier stopping time
, then terminal reward  is replaced by an early exercise reward L related to time  of
quitting.
If the early exercise reward L is progressively measurable and continuous, and as time
is up if L(T ) is not above terminal reward , the solution to the BSDE
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:






Z(s)dBs + K(T )   K(t);
Y(t)  L(t), 0  t  T ,
Z T
0
(Y(t)   L(t))dK(t) = 0
(1.3.22)
provides the value process of the optimal stopping problem (1.3.21) and its optimal






h(s)ds + L()1f<T g + 1f=T g
Ft# : (1.3.23)
Since a player can always quit immediately at time t and leave with an early exercise re-
ward L(t), the maximum reward he could get never falls below L. The optimal stopping
rule can be shown as
 = infft  s  T : Y(s)  L(t)g ^ T; (1.3.24)
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the rst time when early exercise reward meets the best reward possible from below.
Intuitively, the process K is interpreted as the cumulative prot missed for sticking to
the game after the optimal time to quit, hence being increasing in time t. When play-
ing the game before the optimal stopping time when Y meets L, there is no regret, so
K is at. If the player is asleep at the optimal stopping time, he suers from earning
less prot than could be, so K increase accordingly. Seeing from the equation (1.3.22),
whenever the value process Y is about to drop below L, the increasing process K kicks
Y up with a minimal strength.
The process L in (1.3.22) is called a reecting boundary, reecting barrier, or
simply obstacle. Since the value process in the optimization problem can never be
smaller than the early exercise reward L, L is referred to as a lower reecting bound-
ary. A reecting boundary is an additional term in BSDEs to accommodate an early
exercise privilege in optimization problems. A BSDE with a reecting boundary or
reecting boundaries is said to be reected.
As a general form of equation (1.3.22), the reected BSDE
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:






Z(s)dBs + K(T )   K(t);
Y(t)  L(t), 0  t  T ,
Z T
0
(Y(t)   L(t))dK(t) = 0:
(1.3.25)
has been solved by El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez (1997) [19],
in dimension one. With Lipschitz driver g, the solution Y to the equation (1.3.25) is






g(s;Y(s);Z(s))ds + L()1f<T g + 1f=T g
Ft# : (1.3.26)
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The optimal stopping rule  is the rst hitting time of the lower reecting boundary.
 = infft  s  T : Y(s)  L(t)g ^ T: (1.3.27)
El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez (1997) [19] demonstrated existence
of solution to equation (1.3.25) with two methods - contraction and penalization.
As for equation (1.3.4) without reection, the contraction method views solution (Y;Z)
to equation(1.3.25) as a xed point of the contraction mapping from two arbitrary
adapted, square-integrable processes Y0 and Z0 to (Y1;Z1) dened via
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:






Z1(s)dBs + K1(T )   K1(t);
Y1(t)  L(t), 0  t  T ,
Z T
0
(Y1(t)   L(t))dK1(t) = 0:
(1.3.28)









with optimal stopping time  from (1.3.27) is a supermartingale, hence admitting the
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The term K1 is the increasing process from the decomposition, and Z1 comes from








The triplet (Y1;Z1;K1) satises (1.3.28).
The penalization method views solution (Y;Z) to equation(1.3.25) as strong limit of














n(s)   Ln(s)) ds in equation (1.3.32) is the penalization for the value
process Yn to fall below the lower reecting boundary L. The BSDE (1.3.32) is the
non-reected equation solved by Pardoux and Peng (1990) [45]. The proof of con-
vergence of the sequence f(Yn;Zn)g1n=1 mainly relies on the Comparison Theorem to
guarantee that the sequence fYng is increasing thus having a pointwise limit. Lipschitz
condition on the driver g is also required for uniform L2 boundedness of fYng.
In dimension one, El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez (1997) [19]
proves the Comparison Theorem for the reected equation.
With a reecting boundary, the Feynman-Kac formula (1.3.18) for the forward-backward
Markovian system (1.3.16) and (1.3.17) is modied to be a variational inequality. If a
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function y solves the variational inequality
maxfL(t; x)   y(t; x); @ty(t; x) +A y(t; x) + g(t; x; y(t; x); 0(t; x)@xy(t; x))g = 0;
y(T; x) = (x);
(1.3.33)
whereA is the innitesimal generator in (1.3.19), then (Y t;x ;Zt;x ) as in (1.3.20) satises
the system consisting of the forward equation (1.3.16) and the backward equation
Y t;x(s) =(Xt;x(T )) +
Z T
s




+ Kt;x(T )   Kt;x(s), t  s  T:
(1.3.34)
A rigorous treatment of the variational inequality can be found in section 8, El Karoui,
Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez (1997) [19].
A Dynkin game is a zero-sum game of stopping, initiated by Dynkin and Yushkevich




h(s; X)ds + L()1f<T;g + U()1fg + 1f^=T g: (1.3.35)
Player I chooses a stopping time  at which he quits the game. Player II chooses a
stopping time . As soon as either player quits, the game is ended. The payo R(; ) is
the amount that Player II pays Player I at the end of the game. If Player I whistles to end
the game at time  before Player II does, he receives amount L()1f<T g + 1f=T g from
Player II. If Player II quits the game rst, he pays Player I amount U()1f<T g+1f=T g.
The random quantity R(; ) is the reward for Player I and the cost to Player II, which
should therefor be maximized by Player I and minimized by Player II. To average over
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all scenarios, optimize instead the expected payo
Jt(; ) = E[
Z ^
t
h(s; X)ds + L()1f<T;g + U()1fg + 1f^=T gjFt]: (1.3.36)
The saddle point of this Dynkin game is a pair of stopping times (; ), such that
J(; )  J(; )  J(; ): (1.3.37)
The saddle point (; ) attains superema and inma, and identies lower value sup inf
and upper value inf sup in








J(; ) = V¯ : (1.3.38)
In case Player I chooses to stop immediately at current time t, he receives payo L(t)
from Player II. In case Player II chooses to stop immediately at current time t, he pays
payo U(t) to Player I. When existing, value V of the game as Player I's maximum
reward and Player II's minimum cost is always above L and below U. For this Dynkin
game, it suces to consider only early exercise rewards L  U.
When early exercise rewards L and U are continuous, the value process Y of the dou-
blely reected BSDE
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:






Z(s)dBs + K+(T )   K+(t)   (K (T )   K (t));
L(t)  Y(t)  U(t), 0  t  T ,
Z T
0
(Y(t)   L(t))dK(t) =
Z T
0
(U(t)   Y(t))dK(t) = 0
(1.3.39)
provides the value process V of Dynkin game with expected payo (1.3.36). The in-
creasing process K+ is the minimal force that maintains value process Y above lower
reecting boundary L. K+ is an additional term for early exercise privilege at time 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by Player I, to maximize his reward. For early exercise privilege at time  by Player II
to minimize his cost, a minimal cumulative force K , which is an increasing process,
pushes value process Y downwards whenever it hits upper reecting boundary U from
below.
The connection between Dynkin games and doublely reected BSDEs was explored
in Cvitanic and Karatzas (1996) [10]. They proved existence and uniqueness of solu-
tion to the equation
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:






Z(s)dBs + K+(T )   K+(t)    (T )   K (t));
L(t)  Y(t)  U(t), 0  t  T ,
Z T
0
(Y(t)   L(t))dK(t) =
Z T
0
(U(t)   Y(t))dK(t) = 0:
(1.3.40)
with Lipschitz driver g. The authors demonstrate uniqueness of the solution with both
contraction and penalization methods.
1.3.3 Growth rates beyond Lipschitz
The problem of risk-sensitive controls were proposed by Whittle, Bensoussan and
coworkers, among others. Receiving a controlled random reward R, a risk-sensitive
player takes not only the expectation but also the variance of his reward into consid-
eration. El Karoui and Hamadene (2003) in [18] explores the connection between
risk-sensitive control problems and BSDEs with an additional term quadratic in the
volatility process.
We consider a general risk preference coecient . For the Player with reward pro-
cess Rt(u) controlled by u, the quantity
Eu[Rt(u)jFt] + 2Var
u[Rt(u)jFt] (1.3.41)
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when the absolute value jj is small. If  > 0 (< 0), a larger variance contributes to
a larger (small) expected reward, hence a higher risk is more (less) preferable to the
Player. The Player is called risk-prone if  > 0, and risk-averse if  < 0. If  = 0,
the variance term disappears from the expected reward, then the Player is said to be
risk-neutral. So, instead of maximizing the expected reward, our risk-sensitive Player
maximizes his expected exponential reward
Jt(u) = Eu[expfRt(u)gjFt]: (1.3.43)
Let Rt(u) take a generic form
R T
t h(s; X; us)ds + , where X is the underlying state
process. Let H be Hamiltonian as
H(t; x; z; u) := z 1(t; x) f (t; x; u) + h(t; x; u): (1.3.44)
A solution (Yu;Zu) to the quadratic BSDE
Yu(t) =  +
Z T
t











We notice from expression (1.3.43) that  is equivalent to a rescaling multiplier of the
reward Rt, so it suces to to solve BSDE (1.3.45) for the case  = 1.
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More generally, if the value processes (y; z) solve
y(t) = e +
Z T
t




then by Ito's formula, the processes (Y;Z) dened via
8>>>>><>>>>>:

















The equation (1.3.47), thus the equation (1.3.49), has a solution when the driver g
and the terminal value  are bounded. The existence of solution to (1.3.47) is due to
Pardoux and Peng (1990) [45]. Since the transformation between Y and y in (1.3.48)
is monotonic, when the Comparison Theorem is needed for equations with quadratic
growth, one can compare solutions to equations of the form (1.3.47), then conclude by
transforming back to solutions to (1.3.49). Again, comparison can be applied assuming
that g and  are bounded.
Above is a brief illustration of connections between risk-sensitive controls and quadratic
BSDEs. A zero-sum game corresponds to a one-dimensional BSDE, and a non-zero-
sum game a multidimensional equation. The rigorous formulation and the technical
treatment to the risk-sensitive control problems using quadratic BSDEs can be found
in El Karoui and Hamadene (2003) [18].
Kobylansky (2000) [40] considers one-dimensional BSDEs whose drives have quadratic
growth rate, not necessarily a quadratic term, in the volatility process. Her basic
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idea was the exponential transformation (1.3.48), which requires some condition like
bounded parameters. Up to an exponential change, she approximated a quadratic driver
with a monotonic sequence of Lipschitz drivers. Solution to the quadratic BSDE turns
out to be limit of a monotonic sequence of solutions. It was the Comparison Theorem
that guarantees monotonicity of solutions to the sequence of approximating equations.
Even for controls indierent to the risk, since the driver of a BSDE corresponds to
the Hamiltonian of a control problem, more general growth rates of the driver allows
for growth rates of the game rewards.
1.3.4 Dierence in several dimensions
It would be tempting to extend all the results on one dimensional BSDEs to mul-
tidimensional equations, for example Comparison Theorems, reections, and higher
growth rates, one reason being the correspondence between multidimensional BSDEs
and non-zero-sum games.
We consider an N-Plyer non-zero-sum stochastic dierential game of control. Each
player, indexed by i, chooses a control ui. Player i receives a reward Ri(u1;    ; uN)
related to all the N Players' controls. The Players' rewards have the form
Rit(u1; u2;    ; uN) =
Z T
t
hi(s; X; u1; u2;    ; uN)ds + ijFt], 0  t  T , i = 1;    ;N:
(1.3.50)
Player i receives a cumulative reward at rate hi and terminal reward i. He aims at
optimizing his expected reward [Ri(u1; u2;    ; uN)jFt]. The Hamiltonian
H = (H1;H2;    ;HN)
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is dened as
Hi(t; X; zi; u1; u2;    ; uN) :=zi 1(t; X) f (t; X; u1; u2;    ; uN)
+ hi(t; X; u1; u2;    ; uN), i = 1;    ;N:
(1.3.51)
If the N-dimensional processes
Yu1;u2; ;uN = (Yu1;u2; ;uN1 ;    ;Yu1;u2; ;uNN ); (1.3.52)
and
Zu1;u2; ;uN = (Zu1;u2; ;uN1 ;    ;Zu1;u2; ;uNN ) (1.3.53)
solve the N-dimensional BSDE
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
































then the value process Yu1;u2; ;uN of the BSDE provides the value process J(u1; u2;    ; uN)
of the non-zero-sum game.
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is thus of interest. The case of Lipschitz driver g = (g1;    ; gN) has been covered
in the work Pardoux and Peng (1990) [45]. One might ask for extending to drivers
of higher growth rate, like Kobylanski's 2000 work [40] in dimension one. We recall
that Kobylanski concluded convergence of the approximating sequence by showing its
monotonicity via Comparison Theorem. But in several dimensions, Lipschitz growth
is far from enough for the Comparison Theorem to hold. An equivalent condition to
apply the Comparison Theorem is provided by Hu and Peng (2006) [31].
Hamadene, Lepeltier and Peng (1997) [26] worked on the Markovian case, assum-
ing that the driver g(t; x; y; z) is a continuous function, with growth rate polynomial in
x, and linear in y and z. They also approximated the driver with Lipschitz drivers, rst
deriving a weakly convergent subsequence of solutions to the approximating equations
by weak compactness, then arguing that the weak limit is in fact strong under an L2-
dominance assumption. It is a pity that they did not realize that the L2-dominance
assumption is not necessary and can be removed.
In order to modify a non-zero-sum game with rewards (1.3.50) to incorporate optimal
stopping features, reections have to be added to the N-dimensional (1.3.55). When a
reected BSDE had only one dimension, El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and
Quenez (1997) [19] provided two methods - contraction and penalization. The pe-
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nalization method does not help with solving multi-dimensional equations, again due
to the lack of Comparison Theorem. The contraction method requires at most Lips-
chitz growth of the drivers. In Chapter 3, we shall explore the connections between
non-zero-sum games of control with optimal stopping features and multidimensional
BSDEs with reection. Existence and uniqueness of solutions to such equations will
be shown for Lipschitz drivers. In the Markovian framework, we shall prove existence
of solutions to the equations with growth rates linear in the value process and in the
volatility process, and polynomial in the historical maximum of state process.
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Chapter 2
Martingale Interpretation
Chapter 3 of this dissertation is adapted fromKaratzas and Li (2009) [32]. That piece of
work solves a non-zero-sum game of control and stopping, by identifying value process
of the game with the solution to a multi-dimensional reected backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations (BSDE). There, we prove the necessity of Isaacs' condition for the
existence of equilibrium strategy. The main tools are analytical technicalities to prove
existence of solution to the BSDE. The Comparison Theorem are used to prove the
optimality of the controls that satisfy Isaacs' condition. The opportunity to use heavy
analysis is an advantage of the BSDE approach, for it is easier to solve the optimization
problems under more general technical conditions. But our concern is, that too much
heavy analysis in our BSDE chapter might disguise intuitions. To remind ourselves of
the nature of the optimization problem that we solved, this chapter presents an equiv-
alent martingale characterization of Nash equilibrium point of the non-zero-sum game
in question. Starting o from this martingale characterization, Isaacs' condition turns
out to be necessary and sucient for the existence of equilibrium controls.
Without controls, the non-zero-sum game of stopping was solved by Bensoussan and
41
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Friedman in as early as 1977, using variational inequalities. Without stopping, a mar-
tingale approach to the non-zero-sum game of control can be found in Davis (1979)
[12], whose treatment will help us prove suciency of Isaacs' condition for the exis-
tence of equilibrium controls. This chapter is partly also a follow-up of Karatzas and
Zamrescu (2008) [39], which gave martingale characterization of saddle point of a
zero-sum game where one player controls and the other stops. In order to get the exis-
tence of a saddle point, the lower value and the upper value of the game have to equate
to each other. Karatzas and Zamrescu (2008) [39] argued the coincidence of several
stopping rules. For the existence of an equilibrium, we no longer need to balance be-
tween sup inf and inf sup, whereas the diculty switches to maximizing more that one
expected rewards with the same set of strategies. We will take the way Karatzas and
Sudderth (2006) [36] passes from a game where each player's reward is terminated by
himself to a game of interactive stopping. To accommodate path-dependent rewards,
Snell envelopes named after Snell (1952) [48], instead of stopping regions for Marko-
vian rewards (c.f. Shiryayev (1979) [47]), are used to derive optimal stopping rules.
2.1 Mathematical layout
The rigorous model starts with a d-dimensional Brownian motion B() with respect to
its generated ltration fFtg0tT on the canonical probability space (
;F ;P), in which

 = Cd[0;T ] is the set of all continuous d-dimensional functions on a nite determin-




is the Borel sigma algebra, and P is the
Wiener measure.
For every t 2 [0;T ], let us dene a mapping t : C[0;T ] ! [0;T ] by t(y)(s) = y(s^ t),
which truncates the function y 2 C[0;T ]. For any y0 2 C[0;T ], the pre-image  1t (y0)
collects all functions in C[0;T ] which are identical to y0 up to time t. A stopping rule
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is a mapping  : C[0;T ] ! [0;T ], such that
fy 2 C[0;T ] : (y)  tg 2  1t (B (C[0; T ])) : (2.1.1)
The set of all stopping rules ranging between t1 and t2 is denoted byS (t1; t2).
The state process X() solves the stochastic functional equation
X(t) = X(0) +
Z t
0
(s; X)dBs, 0  t  T; (2.1.2)
where the volatility matrix  : [0;T ] 
! Rd Rd, (t; !) 7! (t; !), is a predictable
process.
Assumption 2.1.1 (1) The volatility matrix (t; !) is nonsingular for every (t; !) 2
[0;T ] 
;
(2) there exists a positive constant A such that
ji j(t; !)   i j(t; !¯)j  A sup
0st
j!(s)   !¯(s)j; (2.1.3)
for all 1  i; j  d, for all t 2 [0;T ], !; !¯ 2 
.
Under Assumption 2.1.1 (2), for every initial value X(0) 2 Rd, there exists a pathwise
unique strong solution to equation (3.1.2) (Theorem 14.6, Elliott (1982) [21]).
The control vector u = (u1;    ; uN) take values in some given separable product met-
ric spaces A = 
Ni=1Ai. We shall assume that A1;    ;AN are countable unions of
nonempty, compact subsets, and are endowed with the -algebras 
Ni=1Ai of their re-
spective Borel subsets. In this chapter, we use the set U = 
Ni=1Ui of closed loop con-
trol vectors in the form of ut = (t; !) that is an N-dimensional non-anticipative func-
tional of the state process X(), for 0  t  T , where  = (1;    ; N) : [0;T ]
! A
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is a deterministic measurable mapping.
We consider the predictable mapping
f : [0;T ] 
  A! Rd;




(3) There exists a positive constant A such that
 1(t; !) f (t; !; (t; !))  A; (2.1.5)
and






for all 0  t  T, ! 2 
, and all the A-valued representative elements (t; !) of the
control space U .
For generic control vectors ut = (t; !), dene P
u, a probability measure equivalent to
P, via the Radon-Nykodim derivative
dPu
dP
Ft = exp(Z t
0









Then by Girsanov Theorem,
But := Bt  
Z t
0
 1(s; X) f (s; X; us)ds, 0  t  T; (2.1.8)
is a Pu-Brownian Motion with respect to the ltration fFtg0tT . In the probability
space (
;F ;P) and with respect to the ltration fFtg0tT , the pair (X; Bu) is a weak
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solution to the forward stochastic functional equation
Xt = X0 +
Z t
0
f (s; X; us)ds +
Z t
0
(s; X)dBus , 0  t  T: (2.1.9)
In the three subsequent sections of this chapter, we shall study, in a sequel, optimization
problems with the following rewards.




h(s; X; us)ds + L()1f<g + 1f=g: (2.1.10)
In Problem 2.1.1, ut = ut = (t; !) is a control in U = U1 =: U ,  is a stopping
rule in S , and  in S (t; ) is a stopping rule valued between t and , for t  . Both
the control u and the stopping rule  is at the player's choice. The cumulative reward
rate h : [0;T ]  
  A ! R, (t; !; (t; !)) 7! h(t; !; (t; !)), is a predictable process
in t, non-anticipative functional in X(), and measurable function in (t; !). The early
exercise reward L : [0;T ]  
 ! R, (t; !) 7! L(t; !) =: L(t), is a fFtg0tT -adapted
process. The terminal reward  is a real-valued F-measurable random variable. The
rewards h, L and  are a.e. bounded for all ! 2 
, 0  t  T , and all admissible
controls ut = (t; !).
Problem 2.1.2 (N = 2, two-player game)
R1t (; ; u; v) :=
Z ^
t
h1(s; X; us; vs)ds + L1()1f<g + U1()1f<T g + 11f^=T g;
R2t (; ; u; v) :=
Z ^
t
h2(s; X; us; vs)ds + L2()1f<g + U2()1f<T g + 21f^=T g:
(2.1.11)
In Problem 2.1.2, (ut; vt) = ((t; !); (t; !)) is a pair of controls in U = U1  U2 =:
U  V , and  and  are stopping rules in S (t;T ). The control u and the stopping
rule  is at the choice of Player I. The control v and the stopping rule  is at the
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choice of Player II. Player I receives reward R1t (; ; u; v), and Player II receives re-
ward R2t (; ; u; v). The cumulative reward rates h1 and h2 : [0;T ] 
 A1 A2 ! R,
(t; !; (t; !); (t; !)) 7! hi(t; !; (t; !); (t; !)), i = 1; 2, are predictable processes in
t, non-anticipative functionals in X(), and measurable functions in (t; !) and (t; !).
The early exercise rewards L = (L1; L2)0 : [0;T ]
! R2, (t; !) 7! L(t; !) =: L(t), and
U = (U1;U2)0 : [0;T ]  
 ! R2, (t; !) 7! U(t; !) =: U(t) are both fFtg0tT -adapted
processes. The terminal reward  = (1; 2)0 is a pair of real-valued FT -measurable
random variables. The rewards h = (h1; h2)0, L, U and  are a.e. bounded for all
! 2 
, 0  t  T , and all admissible controls ut = (t; !) and vt = (t; !). Here and
throughout this chapter the notation M0 means transpose of some matrix M.




hi(s; X; us)ds + Li(i)1fDig + Ui((i))1fDci nEg + i1fEg; (2.1.12)
where the events E and D1;    ;DN are denes as
E = f j = T, for all j = 1;    ;Ng; (2.1.13)
and
Di = fi < all of 1;    ; i 1; i+1;    ; Ng; (2.1.14)
and the stopping rules
min = minf1;    ; Ng; (2.1.15)
and
(i) = minf1;    ; i 1; i+1;    ; Ng: (2.1.16)
In Problem 2.1.3, ut = (u
1
t ;    ; uNt ) = t = (1(t; !);    ; N(t; !)) is a control vector
in U = U1     UN , and  = (1;    ; N) is a vector of N stopping rules inS (t;T ).
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For i = 1;    ;N, the control ui and the stopping rule i is at the choice of the ith
player, who receives reward Rit(; u). The cumulative reward rate and h = (h1;    ; hN) :
[0;T ] 
 A! RN , (t; !; (t; !)) 7! h(t; !; (t; !)), is an N-dimensional predictable
process in t, non-anticipative functional in X(), and measurable function in (t; !). The
early exercise rewards L = (L1;    ; LN)0 : [0;T ]  
 ! RN , (t; !) 7! L(t; !) =: L(t),
andU = (U1;    ;UN)0 : [0;T ]
! RN , (t; !) 7! U(t; !) =: U(t) are both fFtg0tT -
adapted processes. The terminal reward  = (1;    ; N)0 is a vector of N real-valued
FT -measurable random variables. The rewards h, L, U and  are a.e. bounded for all
! 2 
, 0  t  T , and all admissible controls ut = (t; !).
2.2 A representative player's optimization
In this section, we will focus on solving a representative player's optimization Problem
2.1.1 with the expected reward
Jt(; u) := Eu[Rt(; u)jFt]; (2.2.1)
where the reward Rt(; u) is dened as in (2.1.10). This is a question of discretionary
stopping, nding a stopping rule  and control u to maximize the expected reward
(2.2.1), over all stopping rules  in S (t; ) and all controls u in U . It is the very op-
timization problem that a generic ith player in an N-player game faces, when all the
other players' strategies are given.
The following notations will facilitate expositions in this section.





Jt(; u) = Jt(; u): (2.2.2)
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The process Y is called the value process of the optimal control and stopping problem
with expected reward (2.2.1).
(2) For a generic admissible control u, dene






















Y(t; u) := sup
2S (t;)
Jt(; u)  Jt(t; u) = L(t)1ft<g + 1ft=g: (2.2.4)
We remember that Jt(t; u) refers to the conditional expectation Eu[L(t)1ftg+1ft=gjFt].
Because  is an fFtg-stopping rule, the events ft  g and ft = g are Ft measur-
able. On ft  g, Jt(t; u) = L(t) because L is progressively measurable. On ft = g,
Jt(t; u) = Eu[jF] = , because  is F-measurable. This is why the last identity in
(2.2.4) holds true.
(4) Also for a generic u, dene
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(5) The Hamiltonian is dened as
H(t; !; z; ut) = H(t; !; z; (t; !)) := z 1(t; !) f (t; !; (t; !)) + h(t; !; (t; !)); (2.2.6)
for 0  t  T , ! 2 
, z in Rd, and all admissible controls ut = (t; !).
2.2.1 Optimal stopping
In (2.2.4), Y(; u) is said to be the value process of the optimal stopping problem. The
process Q(; u) dened by equaitons (2.2.5) is the Snell envelope of R0(; u). It is the
smallest RCLL supermartingale dominating R0(; u). A proof of results in Lemma 2.2.1
can be found in (Appendix D, Karatzas and Shreve (1998) [35]). The proofs in their
book proceed with a nite deterministic terminal time, but are also valid for a bounded
fFtgt-stopping time as the terminal time. To pass to the bounded random terminal time
 which is an fFtg-stopping time, it suces to multiply the reward with an indicator
1ftg. Please see the remark at the end of Elliott (1976) [22].
Let  = t (u; ) be an optimal stopping rule (stopping time) that attains supremum
in (2.2.5), i.e.,





h(s; X; us)ds: (2.2.7)
The following lemma provides an equivalent characterization of .
Lemma 2.2.1 The optimality of  is equivalent to both of the following conditions
altogether:
(1)
Q(; u) = R0(; u); (2.2.8)
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or equivalently,
Y(; u) = L()1f<g + 1f=g; (2.2.9)
(2) The stopped supermartingale Q(^; u) is a Pu-martingale with respect to fFtg0t.
Besides,  has an explicit expression as the rst hitting time
 = infft  s < jQ(s; u) = R0(s; u)g ^ 
= infft  s < jY(s; u) = L(s)g ^ :
(2.2.10)
The optimal time from now on to stop the reward stream is the rst time when the value
process Y(; u) drops down to the early exercise reward L(). If the two processes never
meet, then wait until the end to take a terminal reward  at time .
2.2.2 Optimal control and stopping
Classical theory on optimal stopping has helped us identify a stopping rule that maxi-
mizes the expected reward J(; u) over all stopping rules inS (t; ).
If there is a u 2 U such that for the optimal stopping rule ,
Jt(; u)  Jt(; u), a.s. on [0;T ] 
, 8u 2 U ; (2.2.11)
then since, from subsection 2.2.1,
Jt(; u)  Jt(; u), 8u 2 U ;  2 S (t; ); (2.2.12)
the pair of strategies (; u) satises
Jt(; u)  Jt(; u), 8u 2 U ;  2 S (t; ): (2.2.13)
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That (; u) satises inequality (2.2.13) is equivalent to its maximizing (2.2.1) and at-
taining suprema in (2.2.2).
The rest of this subsection will look for such a u satisfying inequality (2.2.11). To
simplify notations, in proofs of this subsection, L() is redened as
L(t) := L(t)1ft<g + 1ft=g, 0  t  : (2.2.14)
LetUt denote the quotient space where controls inU identical on [t;T ] are equivalent.
To be rigorous, for any u; v 2 U ,
u  v, if and only if us = vs, a.s. on (s; !) 2 [t; T ] 
; (2.2.15)
Ut = U =  : (2.2.16)
Lemma 2.2.2 (Karatzas and Zamrescu (2008) [39])
Suppose 0  1  2  T. 1 and 2 are both fFtg-stopping times. us = vs on
s 2 [1; 2], then for any boundedF2 -measurable random variable ,




Jt(; u) = sup
u2Ut
Jt(; u): (2.2.18)
To maximize Jt(; u) over u 2 U , it suces to consider the values of controls on [t;T ].
Lemma 2.2.3 For any t 2 [0;T ], and any  2 S (t; ), the set of random variables
fJt(; u)gu2Ut is a family directed upwards, i.e., for any u1 and u2 in Ut, there exists a
u0 2 Ut, such that
Jt(; u0) = Jt(; u1) _ Jt(; u2): (2.2.19)
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Hence there exists a sequence of controls un() 2 Ut, such that
lim




Proof. Dene anFt-measurable set
A := f! 2 
jJt(; u1)  Jt(; u2)g: (2.2.21)
Let u0 = u11fAg + u21fAcg 2 Ut. Then






[Rt(; u1)jFt], on A
Eu
2
[Rt(; u2)jFt], on Ac
= Jt(; u1) _ Jt(; u2):
(2.2.22)
By the proposition on page 121 of Neveu (1975) [43], there exists a sequence of con-
trols in Ut, approximating the supremum from below. By Lemma 2.2.2, supremum of
Jt(; u) over Ut is the same as supremum over U . 
Theorem 2.2.1 A strategy (; u) is optimal in the sense of (2.2.13), if and only if the
following three conditions hold.
(1) Y() = L()1f<g + 1f=g;
(2) V( ^ ; u) is a Pu-martingale;
(3) For every u 2 U , V( ^ ; u) is a Pu-supermartingale.
Proof. if
For any    2 St; and any u 2 U , L()  Y(; u) = Y(). By (2.2.2), (2.2.3),





h(s; X; us)ds = L()+
Z 
0
h(s; X; us)ds  Y()+
Z 
0
h(s; X; us)ds = V(; u):
(2.2.23)














In (2.2.25), the identity comes from (2.2.3) the denition of V , rst inequality from
supermartingale property (3), and second inequality from (2.2.23). From martingale
property (2), and identity (2.2.24), both inequalities become equalities if u = u and
 = . Hence for any u 2 Ut, any  2 S (t; )
Eu[Rt( ^ ; u)jFt]  Y(t); (2.2.26)
where equality attained by u = u and  = .
only if
Condition (1) comes from Lemma 2.2.1.  = (; u) has the form of (2.2.10). For
any u 2 U , Lemma 2.2.10 states that Y(; u) = L()1f<g + 1f=g. Condition (1)
is true, because Y() = sup
u2U
Y(; u).
To see the supermartingale property (3), take 0  s  t    T , and an arbitrary








































Since u is optimal,
Js(; u)  Js(; u): (2.2.28)
By Lemma 2.2.3, there exists a sequence of controls fungn 2 Ut, such that
lim
n!1 " Jt(
; un) = Jt(; u): (2.2.29)









 Js(; u): (2.2.30)









 Js(; u): (2.2.31)
Adding
R s
0 h(r; X; ur)dr to both sides of (2.2.31), and by denition of V in (2.2.3),
Eu[V(t; u)jFs]  V(s; u): (2.2.32)
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From the supermartingale property (3), V( ^ ; u) is a Pu-supermartingale. In order
that it is a Pu

-martingale, it suces to show
Eu

[V(; u)] = V(0; u): (2.2.33)














































The last equation in (2.2.35) comes from the denition of V in (2.2.3). Since t can be
chosen arbitrarily over [0; ], equating the rst and last terms in (2.2.35) gives (2.2.33).
This proves (2). 
Denition 2.2.1 (Thrifty) A control u is called thrifty, if and only if fV(t ^ ; u)g0t
is a Pu-martingale, where  is dened in (2.2.10).
This denition is drawn from a dynamic programming denition of thrifty strategies
on page 48, Dubins and Savage (1965) [14].
Proposition 2.2.1 With the choice of optimal stopping rule  from (2.2.10), a strategy
u 2 U is optimal in the sense of (2.2.13), if and only if it is thrifty.
Proof. This is a proposition from Theorem 2.2.1. 
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Theorem 2.2.2 Let  as dened in (2.2.10), and fV(t; u)gt2[0;] dened as in (2.2.3).
Then the following statements hold true
(1) The process fV(t; u)gt2[0;] admits the Doob-Meyer Decomposition
V(t; u) = Y(0)   A(t; u) + M(t; u), 0  t  (u) ^ (v): (2.2.36)
Y(0) = V(0; u), for all u 2 U .
(2) The process M(; u) is a right-continuous, uniformly integrable Pu-martingale. Fur-





where Z is a predictable, square-integrable process not depending on u.
(3) A(0; u) = 0. The process A(; u) is an increasing, integrable process, satisfying
A(t; u)   A(t; v) =  
Z t
0
(H(s; X;Zs; us)   H(s; X;Zs; vs))ds, 0  t  ; (2.2.38)
where Z is dened in (2.2.37).
Proof. By Theorem 2.2.1, fV(t; u)gt2[0;] is a Pu-supermartingale. Boundedness of the
rewards guarantees that it is of classD . It then admits the Doob-Meyer Decomposition
(cf. page 24-25, Karatzas and Shreve (1988) [34])
V(t; u) = V(0; u)   A(t; u) + M(t; u), 0  t  : (2.2.39)
By denitions of V and Y , (2.2.2) and (2.2.3), V(0; u) = Y(0), for all u 2 U . The
Pu-martingale M(; u) has the representation (Theorem 3.1, Fujisaki, Kallianpur, and








where Zu is a predictable, square-integrable process. It remains to show Zu does not
depend on u. By denition of Bu in (2.1.8),










 1(s; X) f (s; X; us)ds +
Z t
0
ZusdBs, 0  t  :
(2.2.41)
Take arbitrary u; v 2 U . From (2.2.3) and replacing u by v in (2.2.41),
V(t; u) =V(t; v) +
Z t
0
(h(s; X; us)   h(s; X; vs))ds













Identifying martingale terms in (2.2.41) and in (2.2.42), because of uniqueness of mar-
tingale representation, we conclude
Zu = Z
v
 =: Z: (2.2.43)
Identifying nite variation terms in (2.2.41) and in (2.2.42),








(H(s; X;Zs; us)   H(s; X;Zs; vs))ds, 0  t  (u) ^ (v):
(2.2.44)
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
Proposition 2.2.2 (Stochastic Maximum Principle)
If (; u) is optimal, then for all u 2 U , and for all 0  t  (u) ^ (u),
H(t; X;Zt; ut )  H(t; X;Zt; ut), a.e., (2.2.45)
with the process Z dened as in (2.2.37).
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. The optimality of
(; u) implies that V(; u) is a martingale up to time , hence A(; u) = 0. Also




(H(s; X;Zs; us)   H(s; X;Zs; us))ds, 0  t  (u) ^ (u): (2.2.46)
That A(; u) being increasing forces H(; X;Z; u )   H(; X;Z; u) to be nonnegative. 
Theorem 2.2.3 Let  be the optimal stopping rule dened as in (2.2.10). If a control
ut = (t; !) in U maximizes the Hamiltonian in the sense of Isaacs' condition
H(t; !; z; (t; !))  H(t; !; z; (t; !)); (2.2.47)
for all 0  t  , ! 2 
, z 2 Rd, and ut = (t; !) in U , then u is optimal in the sense
that
Jt(; u)  Jt(; u), for all 0  t  , and u 2 U : (2.2.48)
Proof. This proof follows the treatment in (section 4, Davis (1979) [12]).













(h(r; X; ur )   h(r; X; ur))dr: (2.2.49)
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By (2.2.1), (2.2.10), and (2.2.11), It(u) = Jt(; u), and Eu[I (u)jFt] = Jt(; u). But
I(u) can be represented as
Is(u) = It(u)  
Z s
t






for some predictable, Pu

-square-integrable process Z. Remember the denitions of
the Brownian motion Bu in (2.1.8) and the Hamiltonian H in (2.2.6), then
Is(u) = It(u)  
Z s
t
(H(r; X;Zr ; u







Isaacs' condition (2.2.47) suggests I(u) being a Pu-local supermartingale. Via standard
localization arguments,
Jt(; u) = It(u)  Eu[I (u)jFt] = Jt(; u): (2.2.52)

2.3 The two-player games
In this section, we shall study the two-player game Problem (2.1.2) as a simplest illus-
tration of the N-Player game Problem (2.1.3). Then, to move forward to the N-player
game, it is only a matter of fancier notations.
The two players in Problem Problem (2.1.2), respectively, maximize their expected
reward processes
J1t (; ; u; v) :=E[R
1
t (; ; u; v)jFt];
J2t (; ; u; v) :=E[R
2
t (; ; u; v)jFt]:
(2.3.1)
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Denition 2.3.1 (Equilibrium strategies)
Let  and  be stopping rules inS (t;T ), and (u; v) controls inU V . The strategy
(; ; u; v) is called an equilibrium point of Problem (2.1.2), if for all stopping rules
 and  inS (t;T ), and all controls (u; v) in U  V ,
J1t (
; ; u; v)  J1t (; ; u; v);
J2t (
; ; u; v)  J2t (; ; u; v):
(2.3.2)
Given the strategy (; v) of Player II, Player I's strategy (; u) maximizes his ex-
pected reward over all stopping rules  2 S (t;T ) and all controls u 2 U . Given the
strategy (; u) of Player I, Player II's strategy (; v) maximizes his expected reward
over all stopping rules  2 S (t; T ) and all controls v 2 V . Each Player faces the con-
trol problem with discretionary stopping, the one solved in section 2.2.
The following notation will facilitate expositions in this section.
Notation 2.3.1 (1)
Y1(t; u) := Y1(t; u; ; v) := sup
2S (t;T )
J1t (; ; u; v)  J1t (t; ; u; v);
Y2(t; v) := Y2(t; v; ; u) := sup
2S (t;T )
J2t (; ; u; v)  J2t (; t; u; v):
(2.3.3)
(2)




J1t (; ; u; v);




J2t (; ; u; v):
(2.3.4)
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(3)




h1(s; X; us; vs)ds
= sup
2S (t;T )
J1t (; ; u; v) +
Z t
0
h1(s; X; us; vs)ds
= sup
2S (t;T )
E[R10(; ; u; v)jFt];




h2(s; X; us; vs)ds
= sup
2S (t;T )
J2t (; ; u; v) +
Z t
0
h2(s; X; us; vs)ds
= sup
2S (t;T )
E[R20(; ; u; v)jFt]:
(2.3.5)
(4)
V1(t; ; u; v) :=Y1(t; ; v) +
Z t
0
h1(s; X; us; vs)ds;
V2(t; ; u; v) :=Y2(t; ; u) +
Z t
0
h2(s; X; us; vs)ds:
(2.3.6)
(5) The Hamiltonians are dened as
H1(t; !; z1; ut; vt) = H1(t; !; z1; (t; !); (t; !))
:=z1 1(t; !) f (t; !; (t; !); (t; !)) + h1(t; !; (t; !); (t; !));
H2(t; !; z2; ut; vt) = H2(t; !; z2; (t; !); (t; !))
:=z2 1(t; !) f (t; !; (t; !); (t; !)) + h2(t; !; (t; !); (t; !));
(2.3.7)
for 0  t  T, ! 2 
, z1 and z2 in Rd, and all admissible controls ut = (t; !) and
vt = (t; !).
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2.3.1 Game of stopping
Let us rst x a generic pair of controls u and v for the two Players respectively. Player
I chooses stopping rule  2 S (t;T ), and Player II chooses stopping rule  2 S (t;T ).
Given a stopping rule 0 of Player II, Player I seeks to maximize his expected reward
J1t (
1; 0; u; v) with 1. Given a stopping rule 0 of Player I, Player II seeks to maximize
his expected reward J2t (
0; 1; u; v) with 1.
Denition 2.3.2 (Equilibrium stopping rules)
Let ;  2 S (t;T ), u 2 U , and v 2 V . The pair of stopping rules (; ) is called
an equilibrium stopping rule for the game of stopping with rewards (2.1.11), if for all
;  2 S (t;T ),
J1t (
; ; u; v)  J1t (; ; u; v);
J2t (
; ; u; v)  J2t (; ; u; v):
(2.3.8)
Lemma 2.3.1 That (; ) is a a pair of equilibrium stopping rules is equivalent to
both of the following two conditions altogether.
(1)
Y1(; u; ; v) = L1()1f<g + U1()1f<T g + 11f^=T g; (2.3.9)
and
Y2(; v; ; u) = L2()1f<g + U2()1f<T g + 21f^=T g; (2.3.10)
(2) The stopped supermartingales Q1( ^ ; u; ; v) and Q2( ^ ; v; ; u) are Pu;v-
martingales.
Besides, suppose in addition L1  U1, and L2  U2, a.s., then if their exists a pair
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of stopping rules (; ) satisfying the equations
 = infft  s < jY1(s; u; ; v) = L1(s)g ^ ;
 = infft  s < jY2(s; v; ; u) = L2(s)g ^ ;
(2.3.11)
on rst hitting times, then (; ) are equilibrium.
Proof. Denition 2.3.2 is equivalent to saying, that when Player II uses stopping rule
, Player I' stopping rule  =  attains supremum in
Y1(t; u; ; v) = sup
2S (t;T )
J1t (; 
; u; v); (2.3.12)
and when Player I uses stopping rule , Player II's stopping rule  =  attains supre-
mum in
Y2(t; v; ; u) = sup
2S (t;T )
J2t (
; ; u; v): (2.3.13)
Each Player solves the optimal stopping problem in subsection 2.2.1. Applying Lemma
2.2.1 to the two Players respectively proves Lemma 2.3.1. 
Remark. The pair of equilibrium stopping rules (; ) dened in Denition 2.3.2
always exists. The equations (2.3.9) and (2.3.10) always have solutions. Let t 2 [0;T ]
be the current time, then  =  = t is a trivial equilibrium that satises inequalities
(2.3.8), and that solves the system (2.3.9) and (2.3.10). It does not hurt if no one plays
the game. Non-trivial equilibrium stopping rules are usually the ones of interest.
Theorem 2.3.1 (non-existence of an optimal stopping rule)
Suppose L1  U1 + , and L2  U2 + , a.s. for some real number  > 0. Under
Assumption A 2.1, equilibrium stopping rules do not exist.
Proof. If (; ) were equilibrium, then  would attain supremum in (2.3.12), and 
would attain supremum in (2.3.13). There would have to be  < , a.s., and  < ,
64 CHAPTER 2. MARTINGALE INTERPRETATION
a.s., which is impossible. 
2.3.2 Game of control and stopping
For each of the two Players, when the other Player's strategy is also equilibrium, his
equilibrium strategies solves the control problem with discretionary stopping in sub-
section 2.2.2. Claims in this subsection can be veried by applying Theorems 2.2.1,
2.2.2, and 2.2.3, and Propositions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, to each of the two Players.
Theorem 2.3.2 The set of stopping rules and controls (; ; u; v) is an equilibrium
point of Problem 2.1.2, if and only if the following three conditions hold.
(1)
Y1(; ; v) = L1()1f<g + U1()1f<T g + 11f^=T g; (2.3.14)
and
Y2(; ; u) = L2()1f<g + U2()1f<T g + 21f^=T g; (2.3.15)
(2) The two processes V1(^; ; u; v) and V2(^; ; u; v) are Pu;v-martingales;
(3) For every u 2 U , V1( ^ ; ; u; v) is a Pu;v-supermartingale. For every v 2 V ,
V2( ^ ; ; u; v) is a Pu;v-supermartingale.
Denition 2.3.3 (Thrifty) Suppose (; ) are a pair of stopping rules satisfying (2.3.11).
A pair of controls (u; v) is called thrifty, if and only if V1( ^ ; ; u; v) and V2( ^
; ; u; v) are Pu;v-martingales.
Proposition 2.3.1 With the choice of equilibrium stopping rules (; ) satisfying (2.3.9)
and (2.3.10), a pair of controls (u; v) 2 U V is equilibrium in the sense of Denition
3.1.64, if and only if it is thrifty.
Theorem 2.3.3 Suppose (; ; u; v) is a set of equilibrium strategies, then the fol-
lowing statements hold.
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(1) fV1(t; ; u; v)gt2[0;] and fV2(t; ; u; v)gt2[0;] admit the Doob-Meyer Decompositions
V1(t; ; u; v) =Y1(0; ; v)   A1(t; ; u; v) + M1(t; ; u; v), 0  t  ;
V2(t; ; u; v) =Y2(0; ; v)   A2(t; ; u; v) + M2(t; ; u; v), 0  t  :
(2.3.16)
Y1(0; ; v) = V1(0; ; u; v), Y2(0; ; u) = V2(0; ; u; v), for all u 2 U , v 2 V .




;v-martingale, respectively. Further more, M1(; ; u; v)
and M2(; ; u; v) are represented as stochastic integrals













where Zv1 and Z
u
2 are predictable, square-integrable processes. The process Z
v
1 does not
depend on u, and the process Zv2 does not depend on v.
(3) The processes A1(0; ; u; v) = A2(0; ; u; v) = 0. A1(; ; u; v)) and A2(; ; u; v) are
increasing, integrable processes, satisfying





s ; vs)   H1(s; X; Zv1(s); u2s ; vs))ds,
0  t  ;
A2(t; ; u; v1)   A2(t; ; u; v2) =  
Z t
0
(H2(s; X;Zu2 (s); us; v
1
s)   H(s; X;Zu2(s); us; v2s))ds,
0  t  :
(2.3.18)
Proposition 2.3.2 (Stochastic Maximum Principle)
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t ) H1(t; X;Zv

1 (t); ut; v












t ; vt), for all v 2 V ; 0  t  :
(2.3.19)
Theorem 2.3.4 (suciency of Isaacs' condition)
Let  and  inS (t;T ) be stopping rules satisfying (2.3.8). If the controls ut = (t; !)
in U and vt = (t; !) in V satisfy Isaacs' condition
H1(t; !; z1; (t; !); (t; !))  H1(t; !; z1; (t; !); (t; !));
H2(t; !; z2; (t; !); (t; !))  H2(t; !; z2; (t; !); (t; !));
(2.3.20)
for all 0  t  T, ! in 
, z1 and z2 in Rd, ut = (t; !) in U and vt = (t; !) in V , then
u; v are optimal in the sense that
J1t (
; ; u; v)  J1t (; ; u; v), for all u 2 U ; 0  t  (u; v) ^ (u; v);
J2t (
; ; u; v)  J2t (; ; u; v), for all v 2 V ; 0  t  (u; v) ^ (u; v):
(2.3.21)
If a pair of stopping rules satises the two equivalent conditions in Lemma 2.3.1, for
all controls u 2 U and v 2 V , and if the controls u and v satisfy Isaacs' condition
(2.4.17), then combing (2.3.8) and (2.3.21) suggests that the strategy (; ; u; v) is
an equilibrium point as in Denition 2.3.1.
2.4 The N-player games
When all the other N   1 players' strategies are given, a player faces the optimization
problem that we have solved in section 2.2. This section will extend the two-player
game Problem 2.1.2 studied in section 2.3 to the N-player version Problem 2.1.3.
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Denition 2.4.1 (Equilibrium strategies)
Let  = (1;    ; N) be a vector of stopping rules in S (t;T ), and control vector
u = (u1;    ; uN) in U . The strategy (; u) is called an equilibrium point of the
N-Player stochastic dierential game of control and stopping,
Jit(
; u)  Jit((1;    ; i 1; i; i+1;    ; N); (u1;;    ; ui 1;; ui; ui+1;;    ; uN;));
(2.4.1)
for all stopping rules i in S (t;T ) and all controls ui in Ui, for each player i, i =
1;    ;N.
The characterization of the equilibrium point will use the following notations dened
for all i = 1;    ;N.
Notation 2.4.1 (1)
























Vi(t; ; u) := Yi(t; ; u) +
Z t
0
hi(s; X; us)ds; (2.4.5)
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(5) The Hamiltonians are dened as
Hi(t; !; zi; ut) = Hi(t; !; zi; (t; !)) := zi
 1(t; !) f (t; !; (t; !)) + hi(t; !; (t; !));
(2.4.6)
for 0  t  T, ! 2 
, zi in Rd, and all admissible controls ut = (t; !).
2.4.1 Game of stopping
We rst x an arbitrary control vector u = (u1;    ; uN) for the N-Players. The purpose
of this subsection is to nd a set of equilibrium stopping rules  = (1;    ; N) in the
sense that
Jit(
; u)  Jit((1;    ; i 1; i; i+1;    ; N); u), for all i 2 S (t;T ); (2.4.7)
for all i = 1;    ;N. This is an N-player game of stopping. Equivalent conditions for
the existence of equilibrium stopping rules with be provided for a generic vector u of
controls.
Denition 2.4.2 (Equilibrium stopping rules)
For a generic control vector u = (u1;    ; uN) for the N-Players. The set of stopping
rules  = (1;    ; N) is said to be equilibrium for the N-player game of stopping, if
Jit(
; u)  Jit((1;    ; i 1; i; i+1;    ; N); u), for all i inS (t;T ); (2.4.8)
for all i = 1;    ;N.
Lemma 2.4.1 That  is a vector of equilibrium stopping rules is equivalent to both of
the following conditions altogether, for all i = 1;    ;N,
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(1)
Yi(i ; 
; u) =Rimin (
; u)
=Li(i )1fi <(i)g + Ui(

(i))1f(i)i <T g + i1fmin=T g;
(2.4.9)
(2) The stopped supermartingale Qi( ^ i ; u; ) is a Pu-martingale.
Besides, suppose in addition Li  Ui, a.s., for all i = 1;    ;N, then if their exists
a pair of stopping rules (; ) satisfying the equations
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1 = infft  s < jY1(1; ; u) = L1(s)g ^ (1);
2 = infft  s < jY2(2; ; u) = L2(s)g ^ (2);
:::
N = infft  s < jYN(N ; ; u) = LN(s)g ^ (N);
(2.4.10)
on rst hitting times, then  is an equilibrium stopping rule.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2.1. 
Theorem 2.4.1 (non-existence of an optimal stopping rule)
Suppose Li  Ui + , a.s., for all i = 1;    ;N, for some real number  > 0. Under
Assumption A 2.1, equilibrium stopping rules do not exist.
Proof. If  were equilibrium, there would have to be i < 

(i), a.s., for all i = 1;    ;N,
which is impossible. 
2.4.2 Game of control and stopping
Suppose (; u) is an equilibrium point of the N-player game of controls and stopping.
Given all the other N 1 Players' stopping rules (1;    ; i 1; i+1;    ; N) and controls
(u1;;    ; ui 1;; ui; ui+1;;    ; uN;), the strategy (i; ui) = (i ; ui;) maximizes Player i's




1;    ; i 1; i; i+1;    ; N); (u1;;    ; ui 1;; ui; ui+1;;    ; uN;)): (2.4.11)
Player i faces a maximization problem solved in section 2.2. As consequences of The-
orems 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3, and Propositions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 , we have the following
results for the N-player game.
Theorem 2.4.2 The strategy (; u) is an equilibrium point of the N-player game
of controls and stopping, if and only if the following three conditions hold for all
i = 1;    ;N.
(1)
Yi(i ; 
; u) =Rimin (
; u)
=Li(i )1fi <(i)g + Ui(

(i))1f(i)i <T g + i1fmin=T g;
(2.4.12)
(2) Vi( ^ i ; ; u) is a Pu

-martingale;
(3) For every ui 2 Ui, the process Vi( ^ i ; ; (u1;;    ; ui 1;; ui; ui+1;;    ; uN;)) is a
P(u
1;; ;ui 1;;ui;ui+1;; ;uN;)-supermartingale.
Denition 2.4.3 (Thrifty) Suppose  are equilibrium stopping rules. A vector u of
controls is called thrifty, if and only if Vi( ^ i ; ; u) is a Pu-martingale for all i =
1;    ;N.
Proposition 2.4.1 With the choice of equilibrium stopping rules , a vector u 2 U
controls is equilibrium in the sense of Denition 2.4.1, if and only if it is thrifty.
Theorem 2.4.3 Suppose (; u) are equilibrium strategies, then the following state-
ments are true for all i = 1;    ;N.
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(1) Vi( ^ i ; ; (u1;;    ; ui 1;; ui; ui+1;;    ; uN;)) admits the Doob-Meyer Decom-
position
Vi(t ^ i ; ; (u1;;    ; ui 1;; ui; ui+1;;    ; uN;))
=Yi(0; ; (u1;;    ; ui 1;; ui; ui+1;;    ; uN;))   Ai(t; ui) + Mi(t; ui), 0  t  i :
(2.4.13)
(2) For all ui 2 Ui, Mi(0; ui) = 0. Mi(; ui) is a right-continuous, uniformly integrable
P(u











i is a predictable, square-integrable process identical for all
ui 2 Ui.
(2) For all ui 2 Ui, Ai(0; ui) = 0. The process Ai(; ui) is an increasing, integrable
process, satisfying

















1;;    ; ui 1;; vi; ui+1;;    ; uN;)s
 !
ds;
0  t  i :
(2.4.15)
Proposition 2.4.2 (Stochastic Maximum Principle)
If (; u) is an equilibrium point of the N-player game of controls and stopping, then,
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for all ui 2 Ui, 0  t  .
Theorem 2.4.4 (Suciency of Isaacs' condition)
Let  be a vector of equilibrium stopping rules. If a control vector u = (t; !) in U
satisfy Isaacs' condition
Hi(t; !; zi; (t; !))  Hi(t; !; zi; (1;;    ; i 1;; i; i+1;;    ; uN;)(t; !)); (2.4.17)
for all 0  t  T, ! 2 
, zi 2 Rd, uit = i(t; !) in Ui, for all i = 1;    ;N, then u is
equilibrium in the sense that
Jit(
; u)  Jit(; (u1;;    ; ui 1;; ui; ui+1;;    ; uN;)), for all ui 2 Ui; (2.4.18)
for all i = 1;    ;N. Combining (2.4.7) and (2.4.18), the set of strategies (; u) is an
equilibrium point by Denition 2.4.1.
Chapter 3
BSDE Approach
This chapter considers non-zero-sum games with features of both stochastic control
and optimal stopping, for a process of diusion type, via the backward SDE approach.
Running rewards, terminal rewards and early exercise rewards are all included. The
running rewards can be functionals of the diusion state process. Since the Nash equi-
librium of an N-player non-zero-sum game is technically not more dicult than a two-
player non-zero-sum game, only notationally more tedious, the number of players is
assumed to be two, for concreteness.
Section 3.1 solves two games of control and stopping. The controls enter the drift
of the underlying state process.
In the rst game of section 3.1, each player controls and stops, and his stopping time
terminates his own reward stream only. The value processes of both players are part
of the solution to a multi-dimension BSDE with reecting barrier. The instantaneous
volatilities of the two players' value processes are explicitly expressed in the solution.
Existence of the solution to general forms of the multi-dimensional BSDE with re-
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ecting barrier will be proven in section 3.2 and section 3.3. Then, in the Markovian
framework, the instantaneous volatilities can enter the controls as arguments, in which
case the game is said to observe volatilities in addition to the other two arguments,
namely time and the state-process.
In the second game of section 3.1, there are interactions of stopping. The time for
each player to quit the game is the earliest of his own stopping time and the stopping
time of the other player. Using the original denition of equilibrium introduced by
Nash in 1949, the second game will be reduced to rst solving games of the rst type,
then proving convergence of an iterated sequence of stopping times. The argument
for convergence is monotonicity, hinted at Karatzas and Sudderth (2006) [36]: earlier
stopping implies smaller value processes, and smaller value processes imply even ear-
lier stopping. This technicality, reluctantly, assumes one pair of the terminal rewards is
increasing. Due to the restriction of the comparison theorem to dimension one, conver-
gence of the iteration will be proven for closed loop controls and Markovian controls
only, without observing the volatilities.
Section 3.2 proves existence and uniqueness of the solution to a multi-dimensional
BSDE with reecting barrier, a general form of the one that accompanies Game 3.1.1.
Section 3.3 discusses extension of the existence of solutions to equations of ultra-
Lipschitz growth.
In our Game 3.1.1 where each player terminates his own reward, one may argue the op-
timality of stopping times via the semimartingale decomposition of the value processes.
The BSDE approach here proposes a multi-dimensional BSDE whose value processes
in the solution provide the value processes of the non-zero-sum games. News both
good and bad is that general existence result of solutions to multi-dimensional BSDE
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with reecting barrier still remains a widely open question. As is proven in Hu and
Peng (2006) [31], in several dimensions, the comparison theorem is very restricted, so
the penalization method which solves the one-dimensional counterpart problem does
not help. Without Lipschitz growth condition, convergence arguments of the usual Pi-
card type iteration cannot proceed, either. In a Markovian framework, this paper proves
the Markovian structure of solutions to multidimensional reected BSDEs with Lips-
chitz growth, and uses this Markovian structure as a starting point to extend existence
result to equations with growth rates linear in the value and volatility processes, and
polynomial in state process.
3.1 Two games of control and stopping
In the non-zero sum games of control and stopping to be discussed in this chapter, each
player receives a reward. Based on their up-to-date information, the two players I and
II, respectively, rst choose their controls u and v, then the times  and  to stop their
own reward streams. The controls u and v are two processes that enter the dynamics of
the underlying state process for the rewards. The optimality criterion for our non-zero-
sum games is that of a Nash equilibrium, in which each player's expected reward is
maximized when the other player maximizes his. In taking conditional expectations of
the rewards, the change-of-measure setup to be formulated xes one single Brownian
ltration and one single state process for all controls u and v. Hence when optimizing
the expected rewards over the control sets, there is no need to keep in mind the ltration
or the state process.
Let us set up the rigorous model. We start with a d-dimensional Brownian motion
B() with respect to its generated ltration fFtg0tT on the canonical probability space
(
;F ;P), in which
 = Cd[0;T ] is the set of all continuous d-dimensional function on




is the Borel sigma algebra,
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and P is the Wiener measure.
For every t 2 [0;T ], dene a mapping t : C[0;T ] ! [0;T ] by t(y)(s) = y(s ^ t),
which truncates the function y 2 C[0;T ]. For any y0 2 C[0;T ], the pre-image  1t (y0)
collects all functions in C[0;T ] which are identical to y0 up to time t. A stopping rule
is a mapping  : C[0;T ] ! [0;T ], such that
fy 2 C[0;T ] : (y)  tg 2  1t (B (C[0; T ])) : (3.1.1)
The set of all stopping rules ranging between t1 and t2 is denoted byS (t1; t2).
In the path-dependent case, the state process X() solves the stochastic functional
equation
X(t) = X(0) +
Z t
0
(s; X)dBs, 0  t  T; (3.1.2)
where the volatility matrix  : [0;T ] 
! Rd Rd, (t; !) 7! (t; !), is a predictable
process. In particular in the Markovian case, the volatility matrix  : [0;T ]  Rd !
Rd Rd, (t; !(t)) 7! (t; !(t)), is a deterministic mapping, then the state process equa-
tion (3.1.2) becomes the stochastic dierential equation
X(t) = X(0) +
Z t
0
(s; X(s))dBs, 0  t  T: (3.1.3)
The Markovian case is indeed a special case of path-dependence. Since it will receive
some extra attention later at the end of subsection 3.1.2, we describe the Markovian
framework separately from the more general path-dependent case.
Assumption 3.1.1 (1) The volatility matrix (t; !) is nonsingular for every (t; !) 2
[0;T ] 
;
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(2) there exists a positive constant A such that
ji j(t; !)   i j(t; !¯)j  A sup
0st
j!(s)   !¯(s)j; (3.1.4)
for all 1  i; j  d, for all t 2 [0;T ], !; !¯ 2 
.
Under Assumption 3.1.1 (2), for every initial value X(0) 2 Rd, there exists a pathwise
unique strong solution to equation (3.1.2) (Theorem 14.6, Elliott (1982) [21]).
The controls u and v take values in some given separable metric spaces A1 and A2,
respectively. We shall assume that A1 and A2 are countable unions of nonempty, com-
pact subsets, and are endowed with the -algebrasA1 andA2 of their respective Borel
subsets. The controls u and v are said
(i) to be open loop, if ut = (t; !) and vt = (t; !) are fFtg0tT -adapted processes
on [0;T ], where  : [0;T ]  
 ! A1 and  : [0;T ]  
 ! A2 are non-anticipative
measurable mappings;
(ii) to be closed loop, if ut = (t; X) and vt = (t; X) are non-anticipative functionals of
the state process X(), for 0  t  T , where  : [0;T ]
! A1 and  : [0;T ]
! A2
are deterministic measurable mappings;
(iii) to be Markovian, if ut = (t; X(t)) and vt = (t; X(t)), for 0  t  T , where
 : [0;T ]Rd ! A1 and  : [0; T ]Rd ! A2 are deterministic measurable functions.
In the path-dependent case, the set U  V of admissible controls are taken as all
the closed loop controls. The techniques that we shall use to solve for the optimal
closed loop controls also apply to the open loop controls, so the extension of the results
from closed loop to open loop is only a matter of more complicated notations. The
discussion will be restricted within the class of closed loop controls for clarity of the
exposition. In the Markovian case, the set U  V of admissible controls are taken as
all the Markovian controls. Markovian controls are a subset of closed loop controls.
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We consider the predictable mapping
f : [0;T ] 
  A1  A2 ! Rd;
(t; !; (t; !); (t; !)) 7! f (t; !; (t; !); (t; !));
(3.1.5)
in the path-dependent case, and the deterministic measurable mapping
f : [0;T ] 
  A1  A2 ! Rd;
(t; !; (t; !(t)); (t; !(t))) 7! f (t; !(t); (t; !(t)); (t; !(t)));
(3.1.6)
in the Markovian case, satisfying:
Assumption 3.1.1 (continued)
(3) There exists a positive constant A such that
 1(t; !) f (t; !; (t; !); (t; !))  A; (3.1.7)
for all 0  t  T, ! 2 
, and all the A1  A2-valued representative elements
((t; !); (t; !)) of the control spaces U  V .
For generic controls ut = (t; !) and vt = (t; !), dene Pu;v, a probability measure
equivalent to P, via the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dPu;v
dP
Ft = exp(Z t
0
 1(s; X) f (s; X; us; vs)dBs   12
Z t
0




Then, by the Girsanov Theorem,
Bu;vt := Bt  
Z t
0
 1(s; X) f (s; X; us; vs)ds, 0  t  T (3.1.9)
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is a Pu;v-Brownian Motion on [0;T ] with respect to the ltration fFtg0tT . In the
Markovian case, equation (3.1.9) can be written as
Bu;vt = Bt  
Z t
0
 1(s; X(s)) f (s; X(s); (s; X(s)); (s; X(s)))ds, 0  t  T: (3.1.10)
In the probability space (
;F ;P) and with respect to the ltration fFtg0tT , the pair
(X; Bu;v) is a weak solution to the forward stochastic functional equation
X(t) = X(0) +
Z t
0
f (s; X; us; vs)ds +
Z t
0
(s; X)dBu;vs , 0  t  T; (3.1.11)
in the path-dependent case, and a weak solution to the forward stochastic dierential
equation
X(t) = X(0) +
Z t
0
f (s; X(s); (s; X(s)); (s; X(s)))ds +
Z t
0
(s; X(s))dBu;vs , 0  t  T;
(3.1.12)
in the Markovian case.
When playing the game, the two players choose rst their admissible controls u in
U and v in V , then for any given t 2 [0;T ], they chose t and t from S (t;T ), times
for them to quit the game. The pair of control and stopping rule (u; ) is up to player I
and the pair (v; ) is up to player II. For starting the game at time t, applying controls
u and v, and quitting the game at t and t respectively, the players receive rewards
R1t (t; t; u; v) and R
2
t (t; t; u; v). To average over uncertainty, their respective reward
processes are measured by the conditional Pu;v-expectations
Eu;v[R1t (t; t; u; v)jFt] and Eu;v[R2t (t; t; u; v)jFt]: (3.1.13)
In the non-zero-sum games, the two players seek rst admissible control strategies u
in U and v in V , and then stopping rules t and t from S (t; T ), to maximize their
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; v)jFt]  Eu;v[R1t (t ; t; u; v)jFt], 8t 2 S (t;T ), 8v 2 V :
(3.1.14)
The interpretation is as follows: when player II employs strategy (t ; v), the strat-
egy (t ; u) maximizes the expected reward of player I over all possible strategies on
S (t;T )  U ; and vice versa, when player I employs strategy (t ; u), the strategy
(t ; v) is optimal for player II over all possible strategies on S (t;T )  V . The set
of controls and stopping rules (; ; u; v) is called the equilibrium point, or Nash
equilibrium, of the game. For notational simplicity, denote







the value process of the game for each player i = 1; 2.
In subsections 3.1.1-3.1.2 and subsection 3.1.3, we shall consider two games, which
dier in the forms of the rewards R1 and R2.
Game 3.1.1
R1t (t; t; u; v) = R
1
t (t; u; v) :=
Z t
t
h1(s; X; us; vs)ds + L1(t)1ft<T g + 11ft=T g;
R2t (t; t; u; v) = R
2
t (t; u; v) :=
Z t
t
h2(s; X; us; vs)ds + L2(t)1ft<T g + 21ft=T g:
(3.1.16)
3.1. TWO GAMES OF CONTROL AND STOPPING 81
Game 3.1.2




h1(s; X; us; vs)ds + L1(t)1ft<tg + U1(t)1ftt<T g + 11ft^t=T g;




h2(s; X; us; vs)ds + L2(t)1ft<tg + U2(t)1ftt<T g + 21ft^t=T g:
(3.1.17)
Rewards from both games are summations of cumulative rewards at rates h = (h1; h2)0,
early exercise rewards L = (L1; L2)0 and U = (U1;U2)0, and terminal rewards  =
(1; 2)0. Here and throughout this chapter the notation M0 means transpose of some
matrix M. The cumulative reward rates h1 and h2 : [0;T ]  
  A1  A2 ! R,
(t; X; (t; !); (t; !)) 7! hi(t; X; (t; !); (t; !)), i = 1; 2, are predictable processes in t,
non-anticipative functionals in X(), and measurable functions in (t; !) and (t; !).
The early exercise rewards L : [0;T ]  
 ! R2, (t; !) 7! L(t; !) =: L(t), and
U : [0; T ]  
 ! R2, (t; !) 7! U(t; !) =: U(t) are both fFtg0tT -adapted pro-
cesses. The terminal reward  = (1; 2)0 is a pair of real-valued FT -measurable
random variables. In the Markovian case, the rewards take the form h(t; X; ut; vt) =
h(t; X(t); (t; X(t)); (t; X(t))), L(t) = L¯(t; X(t)), U(t) = U¯(t; X(t)), and  = ¯(X(T )), for
all 0  t  T and some deterministic functions L¯ : [0;T ] Rd ! R, U¯ : [0;T ] Rd !
R, and ¯ : Rd ! R2.
Assumption 3.1.2 (1) The early exercise reward processes L and U are continuous,
progressively measurable. In Game 3.1.1, assume L(T )   holds a.e. on 
. In Game
3.1.2, assume L(t; !)  U(t; !)  (!), a.e. (t; !) 2 [0;T ]  
, and also assume,
for i = 1; 2, that the reward processes Ui(), whose terminal values are dened as
Ui(T ) = i, are increasing processes.
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(2) There exist some constants p  1 and Crwd > 0, such that







a.e. for all ! 2 
, 0  t  T, and all admissible controls ut = (t; !) and vt = (t; !).
From the rewards and the coecients of the state process, we dene the Hamiltonians
associated with our games as
H1(t; !; z1; ut; vt) = H1(t; !; z1; (t; !); (t; !))
:=z1 1(t; !) f (t; !; (t; !); (t; !)) + h1(t; !; (t; !); (t; !));
H2(t; !; z2; ut; vt) = H2(t; !; z2; (t; !); (t; !))
:=z2 1(t; !) f (t; !; (t; !); (t; !)) + h2(t; !; (t; !); (t; !));
(3.1.19)
for 0  t  T , ! 2 
, z1 and z2 in Rd, and all admissible controls ut = (t; !) and
vt = (t; !). From Assumption 3.1.1 (3), the Hamiltonians are Lipschitz functions in
z1 and z2, uniformly over all 0  t  T , ! 2 
, and all admissible controls ut = (t; !)
and vt = (t; !).
Assumption 3.1.3 (Isaacs' condition) There exist admissible controls ut = (t; !) in
U and vt = (t; !) in V , such that
H1(t; !; z1; (t; !); (t; !))  H1(t; !; z1; (t; !); (t; !));
H2(t; !; z2; (t; !); (t; !))  H2(t; !; z2; (t; !); (t; !));
(3.1.20)
for all 0  t  T, ! 2 
, (z1; z2) 2 R2d, and all admissible controls ut = (t; !) and
vt = (t; !).
The Isaacs' conditions on the Hamiltonians are local optimality conditions, formu-
lated in terms of every point (t; z1; z2) in Euclidean space and every path ! in the func-
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tion space 
. Theorems 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 take the local conditions on the Hamiltoni-
ans and transform them into global optimization statements involving each higher-
dimensional objects, such as stopping times, stochastic processes, etc., cumulated in
the Euclidean space and averaged over the probability space. This implication is en-
dowed by the continuous-time setting, contrasted to some discrete-time optimization
problems where local maximization need not lead to global maximization.
When linking value processes of the games to the solutions to BSDEs, we shall dis-
















Lk(m  d; t;T )
:=
(









for k = 1; 2, and 0  t  T .
3.1.1 Each player's reward terminated by himself
This subsection studies Game 3.1.1 where a player's time to quit is determined by
his own decision. We shall demonstrate that the solution to a two-dimensional BSDE
with reecting barrier provides the two players' value processes. The optimal stopping
rules will be derived from reecting conditions of the BSDE. The optimal controls
come from Isaacs' condition, Assumption 3.1.3 on the Hamiltonians, which plays here
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the role of the driver of the corresponding BSDE.
The solution to the following system of BSDEs
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Yu;v1 (t) =1 +
Z T
t
H1(s; X;Zu;v1 (s); us; vs)ds  
Z T
t
Zu;v1 (s)dBs + K
u;v
1 (T )   Ku;v1 (t);
Yu;v1 (t)  L1(t), 0  t  T ;
Z T
0
(Yu;v1 (t)   L1(t))dKu;v1 (t) = 0;
Yu;v2 (t) =2 +
Z T
t
H2(s; X;Zu;v2 (s); us; vs)ds  
Z T
t
Zu;v2 (s)dBs + K
u;v
2 (T )   Ku;v2 (t);
Yu;v2 (t)  L2(t), 0  t  T ;
Z T
0
(Yu;v2 (t)   L2(t))dKu;v2 (t) = 0;
(3.1.23)
provides the players' value processes in Game 3.1.1, with the proper choice of controls
u = u and v = v mandated by Isaacs' condition. From now on, a BSDEwith reecting
barrier in the form of (3.1.23) will be denoted as (T; ;H(u; v); L) for short. The solution
to this BSDE is a triplet of processes (Yu;v;Zu;v;Ku;v), satisfying Yu;v() 2 M2(2; 0;T ),
Zu;v() 2 L2(2  d; 0;T ), and Ku;v() = (Ku;v1 ();Ku;v2 ())0 a pair of continuous increasing
processes inM2(2; 0;T ).
We focus on the game aspect in this section, making use of results like existence of
the solution to the BSDE, one-dimensional comparison theorem and continuous de-
pendence theorems to be proven in section 3.2 and section 3.3. The proofs of claims
will not rely on developments in this section.
Theorem 3.1.1 Let (Yu;v; Zu;v;Ku;v) solve BSDE (3.1.23) with parameters
(T; ;H(u; v); L). Dene the stopping rules
t (y; r) := inffs 2 [t; r] : y(s)  L1(s)g ^ r; (3.1.24)
and
t (y; r) = inffs 2 [t; r] : y(s)  L2(s)g ^ r; (3.1.25)
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, and the controls u 2 U and v 2 V satisfy Isaacs' condition
Assumption 3.1.3. The quadruplet ((u; v); (u; v); u; v) is a Nash equilibrium for
Game 3.1.1. Furthermore, Vi(t) = Yu
;v
i (t), i = 1; 2.
To prove Theorem 3.1.1, we shall need the following lemma.







=Yu;vi ()   Yu;vi (t) +
Z 
t
hi(s; X; us; vs)ds + Ku;vi ()   Ku;vi (t)
(3.1.26)
is a Pu;v-martingale.
Proof. To show that Mu;vi () is a Pu;v-martingale, it suces to show that Mu;vi () is of




h Mu;vi ()1fjMu;vi ()j>cgFti = 0: (3.1.27)
For the xed t 2 [0;T ], denote
(s; us; vs) :=  1(s; X) f (s; X; us; vs), t  s  T: (3.1.28)
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For any  2 S (t;T ), from the change of measure (3.1.8) and the Bayes rule,
Eu;v













































Yu;vi (s)2 + sup
tsT
jX(s)j2p +
Ku;vi (T )2! : (3.1.30)









Ku;vi (T )2# < 1 (3.1.31)
holds. Since (X; B) is a solution to the stochastic functional equation (3.1.2), there












We then apply the dominated convergence theorem to the last conditional expectations
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Because j(s; us; vs)j is bounded by the constant A, from Assumption 3.1.1 (3) and










is a.e. bounded by the constant eA




2(s; us; vs)dBs   12
Z 
t
4j(s; X; us; vs)j2ds
)
(3.1.36)
on [0;T ] with quadratic variation process
hQi () = 4
Z 
t













By the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequalities and inequality (3.1.38), there exists a con-





































2T (T   t)1=2:
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This proves (3.1.34).
The expressions (3.1.29), (3.1.33) and (3.1.34) together gives (3.1.27). 
Proof of Theorem 3.1.1. Let (Yu;v;Zu;v;Ku;v) solve BSDE (3.1.23) with parameters







H1(s; X;Zu;v1 (s); us; vs)ds  
Z t
t
Zu;v1 (s)dBs + K
u;v











1 (t)   Ku;v1 (t):
(3.1.39)
Taking conditional expectation Eu;v[jFt], since Yu;v1 ()  L1(), Yu;v1 (T ) = 1, and Ku;v1 ()











L1(t)1ft^T n1<T g + 11ftg +
Z t
t
h1(s; X; us; vs)ds
Ft# : (3.1.40)
According to the reecting condition in BSDE (3.1.23), and according to the continuity
of Ku;v1 (), Ku;v1 (t(u; v)) = Ku;v1 (t), because Ku;v1 () is at on f(!; t) 2 (
  [0;T ]) :
Yu;v1 (t) , L1(t)g. On ft(u; v) < T g, Yu;v1 (t(u; v)) = L1(t(u; v)); on ft(u; v) = T g,




Yu;v1 (t(u; v)) +
Z t(u;v)
t





L1(t(u; v))1ft(u;v)<T g + 11ft(u;v)=T g +
Z t(u;v)
t





3.1. TWO GAMES OF CONTROL AND STOPPING 89
The expressions (3.1.41) and (3.1.40) mean that
Yu;v1 (t) = E
u;v[R1t (t(u; v); t; u; v)jFt]  Eu;v[R1t (t; t; u; v)jFt]; (3.1.42)
for all t 2 S (t;T ) and all t 2 S (t;T ).
To derive optimality of the controls (u; v) from Isaacs' condition Assumption 3.1.3,
applying the comparison theorem (Theorem 3.2.2 and 3.3.3) to the rst component of
BSDE (3.1.23) gives Yu
;v
1 ()  Yu;v

1 () a.e. on [0;T ]




; v); t(u; v); u; v)jFt] = Yu;v1 (t)
Yu;v1 (t) = Eu;v

[R1t (t(u; v
); t(u; v); u; v)jFt]:
(3.1.43)
As a conjunction of (3.1.42) and (3.1.43), for all t 2 S (t;T ),
Eu
;v[R1t (t(u
; v); t(u; v); u; v)jFt]
Eu;v[R1t (t(u; v); t(u; v); u; v)jFt]
Eu;v[R1t (t; t(u; v); u; v)jFt]:
(3.1.44)
The above arguments proceed with arbitrary stopping times t 2 S (t;T ), because
player II's stopping time t does not enter player I's reward.









; v); t(u; v); u; v)jFt]  Eu;v[R2t (t(u; v); t; u; v)jFt]: (3.1.46)
90 CHAPTER 3. BSDE APPROACH
Combining (3.1.43), (3.1.44), (3.1.45) and (3.1.46) implies, that the quadruplet
(; ; u; v) is a Nash equilibrium and their value processes V() are identied with
the solution to a BSDE with reecting barrier with parameters (T; ;H(u; v); L). The
optimal controls (u; v) are chosen according to Isaacs' condition Assumption 3.1.3.
Both players stop respectively according to the pair of rules (t ; t ), as soon as their
expected rewards hit the early stopping rewards L1() and L2() for the rst time. 
Remark 3.1.1 The absence of Li() from the reward is equivalent to that the ith player
never stops until time T , i = 1; 2. The corresponding BSDE for his optimal reward
exhibits no reecting barrier.
Remark 3.1.2 If the deterministic time T is replaced by a bounded fFtg0tT -stopping
time, it technically does not make any dierence to results in this subsection.
3.1.2 Controls observing volatility
This subsection discusses whether the inclusion of instantaneous volatilities of the
value processes into the controls will expand the admissible control sets.
For the rewards considered in this chapter, when using control u and v, the Pu;v-conditional
expected rewards are Pu;v-Brownian semimartingales with respect to the ltration fFtg0tT ,
having the decompositions













The processes A1() and A2() have nite variation. The processes M1() and M2()
are Pu;v-local martingales with respect to fFtg0tT . The predictable, square-integrable
processes Zu;v1 () and Zu;v2 () from martingale representation are called instantaneous
volatility processes, the very integrand processes of the stochastic integrals in the
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BSDE (3.1.23). Because they naturally show up in the BSDEs solved by value process
of the game, we may include the instantaneous volatilities Zu;v1 () and Zu;v2 () as argu-
ments of the controls u and v, in the hope of making more informed decisions. Going
one step further, in the case of risk-sensitive controls initiated by Whittle, Bensous-
san and coworkers, among others, for example Bensoussan, Frehse and Nagai (1998)
[5], the players are sensitive not only to the expectations, but also to the variances of
their rewards. El Karoui and Hamadene (2003) identied in [18] risk-sensitive con-
trols to BSDEs with quadratic growth in Zu;v1 () and Zu;v2 (), which made the problem
very tractable. Their value processes are dierent from the risk-indierent case only
up to an exponential transformation. Is it better to emphasize sensitivity to volatilities
by including them as arguments of the controls?
Among the set of closed loop controls, including instantaneous volatilities into the
controls means nding all deterministic measurable functionals  : [0;T ]  
  Rd 
Rd ! A1 and  : [0;T ]  
  Rd  Rd ! A2, such that when applying the controls
ut = (t; X;Z1(t); Z2(t)) and vt = (t; X;Z1(t);Z2(t)), for some fFtg0tT -adapted pro-
cesses Z1() and Z2(), the resulted instantaneous volatilities Zu;v1 () and Zu;v2 () in the
semimartingale decomposition (3.1.47) coincide with arguments Z1() and Z2() of 
and .
Including instantaneous volatilities into Markovian controls means the same as what
is described in the previous paragraph, except that  : [0; T ]  Rd  Rd  Rd ! A1
and  : [0;T ]  Rd  Rd  Rd ! A2 are deterministic measurable functions, and that
ut = (t; X(t);Z1(t);Z2(t)) and vt = (t; X(t);Z1(t);Z2(t)). This is the case about which
we are going to have more to say.
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The Hamiltonians in this case become
H1(t; !(t); z1; (; )(t; !(t); z1; z2))
=z1 1(t; !(t)) f (t; !(t); (; )(t; !(t); z1; z2)) + h1(t; !(t); (; )(t; !(t); z1; z2));
H2(t; !(t); z2; (; )(t; !(t); z1; z2))
=z2 1(t; !(t)) f (t; !(t); (; )(t; X(t); z1; z2)) + h2(t; !(t); (; )(t; !(t); z1; z2));
(3.1.48)
for 0  t  T , ! 2 
, z1 and z2 in Rd, and A1 A2-valued measurable functions (; ).
From Assumption 3.1.1 (3) and Assumption 3.1.2 (2), the Hamiltonians are liner in z1
and z2, and polynomial in sup
0st
j!(s)j. To be more specic, we have







for i = 1; 2, all 0  t  T , ! 2 
, z1 and z2 in Rd, and A1A2-valued measurable func-
tions (; ). The growth rates of the Hamiltonians (3.1.48) satisfy Assumption 3.3.1 (2)
for the driver of the BSDE (3.3.2). With all other assumption on the coecients also
satised, by Theorem 3.3.2, there exists a solution (Y;;Z;;K;) to the following
equation
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:













Z;1 (s)dBs + K
;
1 (T )   K;1 (t);
Y;1 (t)  L1(t), 0  t  T ;
Z T
0
(Y;1 (t)   L1(t))dK;1 (t) = 0;













Z;2 (s)dBs + K
;
2 (T )   K;2 (t);
Y;2 (t)  L2(t), 0  t  T ;
Z T
0
(Y;2 (t)   L2(t))dK;2 (t) = 0:
(3.1.50)
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Assumption 3.1.4 (Isaacs' condition) There exist deterministic functions  : [0;T ] 
Rd  Rd  Rd ! A1 and  : [0;T ]  Rd  Rd  Rd ! A2, such that
H1(t; x; z1; (; )(t; x; z1; z2))  sup
z¯1;z¯22Rd
H1(t; x; z1; (; )(t; x; z¯1; z¯2));
H2(t; x; z2; (; )(t; x; z1; z2))  sup
z¯1;z¯22Rd
H2(t; x; z2; (; )(t; x; z¯1; z¯2));
(3.1.51)
for all 0  t  T, x, z1 and z2 in Rd, and all  : [0;T ]  Rd  Rd  Rd ! A1 and
 : [0;T ]  Rd  Rd  Rd ! A2.
Associated with coecients f and  of the state process X() and with the rewards h,
L() and , the admissible set U  V = f(u; v)g of Markovian controls that observe
volatilities are dened as the collection of all









t ) = (


















Assumption 3.1.4 implies Isaacs' condition, Assumption 3.1.3. Then we reach the
same statements as in Theorem 3.1.1, the only dierence being (Yu;v;Zu;v;Ku;v) re-
placed by (Y;; Z;;K;), and BSDE (3.1.23) replaced by BSDE (3.1.50).
In fact, by Theorem 3.3.1, there exist deterministic measurable mappings ;1 and
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;
2 : [0; T ]  Rd ! Rd, such that Z;1 (t) = ;1 (t; X(t)), and Z;2 (t) = ;2 (t; X(t)),
for all 0  t  T . Hence (3.1.52) becomes
(ut; vt) = (; )(t; X(t); 
;
1 (t; X(t)); 
;
2 (t; X(t))); (3.1.56)
a pair of Markovian controls.
3.1.3 Rewards terminated by either player
In this subsection, Game 3.1.2 is studied. One player's time to quit the game is deter-
mined by the conjunction of both players' stopping rules. As soon as one player stops,
the Game 3.1.2 is terminated. When quitting the game, player I receives reward
R10(; ; u; v) =
Z ^
0
h1(s; u; v)ds +
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
L1(), if player 1 stops rst;
U1(), if player 2 stops rst;
1, if neither stops before time T ;
(3.1.57)
whereas player II receives reward
R20(; ; u; v) =
Z ^
0
h2(s; u; v)ds +
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
U2(), if player 1 stops rst;
L2(), if player 2 stops rst;
2, if neither stops before time T:
(3.1.58)
Optimal controls for Game 3.1.2 will again be the pair (u; v) from Isaacs' condition,
Assumption 3.1.3. The interaction of stopping rules seems complicated. Let us tem-
porarily ignore the controls and focus on reducing the game of stopping to a tractable
formulation.
For any xed stopping rules 0t and 
0
t in S (t;T ), let player I choose stopping rule
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t = 
1
t from S (t;T ) and player II choose t = 
1








h1(s; X; us; vs)ds + L1(t)1ft<0t g + U1(
0
t )1f0t t<T g + 11ft^0t =T g;
R2t (
0




h2(s; X; us; vs)ds + L2(t)1ft<0t g + U2(
0
t )1f0t t<T g + 21f0t ^t=T g;
(3.1.59)
in conditional Pu;v-expectations. With a little abuse of the notation U1() and U2() as
in Assumption 3.1.2 (1), rewrite
U1(0t )1f0t t<T g + 11ft^0t =T g = U1(
0
t )1ft0t g;




But suggested by (3.1.59), on ft  0t g, player I's running reward is cut o at time
0t , and terminal reward remains U1(
0
t ) anyway, so he will not prot from sticking to
the game after time 0t . Symmetrically, player II will not prot from stopping after 
0
t .
Because of the indierence to late stopping, maximizing expected rewards (3.1.59) is
equivalent to choosing t = 1t from S (t; 
0
t ) and t = 
1
t from S (t; 
0
t ) to maximize
the conditional Pu;v-expectations of
Z t^0t
t
h1(s; X; us; vs)ds + L1(t)1ft<0t g + U1(
0
t )1ft=0t g;Z 0t ^t
t
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In the spirit of Nash's 1949 original denition of equilibrium, the equilibrium stopping
rules (t ; t ) of Game 3.1.2 is a xed point of the mapping
  :S (t;T ) S (t;T ) ! S (t;T ) S (t;T );
(0t ; 
0
t ) 7! (1t ; 1t ):
(3.1.62)
To show existence of equilibrium stopping rules, it suces to prove a.e. convergence
of iteration via  , starting from a certain initial stopping rule.
This reduction will solve Game 3.1.2 by approximating it with a sequence of much
simpler optimization problems. The optimization is in a simplied form of Game
3.1.1, hence it can be associated with a BSDE with reecting barrier. The admissi-
ble set U  V of controls are still closed loop. At every step of the iteration, there
is no interaction in either controls or stopping. Without interaction, the resulting two-
dimensional BSDE for the players consists in fact of two separate one-dimensional
equations. Hence the comparison theorem for one-dimensional equations applies to
the derivation of the pair of equilibrium controls (u; v) from Assumption 3.1.3 at ev-
ery step of the iteration. So (u; v) should also be equilibrium in the limit. The rst
time when the value process hits the lower reecting boundary is the optimal time to
stop.
Lemma 3.1.2 Let the players' rewards be as in (3.1.61), the value process V() as in
(3.1.15), and (u; v) as in Isaacs' condition, Assumption 3.1.3. The triplet (Yu;v;Zu;v;Ku;v)
satises Yu;v() 2 M2(2; 0;T ), Zu;v() 2 L2(2d; 0;T ), and Ku;v() continuous increasing
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t )   Ku;v1 (t), 0  t  0t ;
Yu;v1 (t)  L1(t), t 2 [0; 0t ];
Z 0t
0












t )   Ku;v2 (t), 0  t  0t ;
Yu;v2 (t)  L2(t), t 2 [0; 0t ];
Z 0t
0
(Yu;v2 (t)   L2(t))dKu;v2 (t) = 0:
(3.1.63)






, and for player II, choose






, where the stopping rules  and  are dened





; v); 0t ; u







; v); u; v)jFt]  Eu;v[R2t (0t ; t; u; v)jFt], 8t 2 S (t; 0t ), 8v 2 V :
(3.1.64)
Furthermore, Vi(t) = Yu
;v
i (t), 0  t  T, i = 1; 2.
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.1.1 to each individual player. 
The following arguments proceed for hi  0. If in general hi   c bounded from be-
low, then the arguments should be tailored by shifting upwards the rewards and value
processes.
Now we start an iteration via  , dened by (3.1.62), with 0t = 
0
t = T , and Y
0
1 () =
Y02 () = +1. Put the controls (u; v) = (u; v). As in Lemma 3.1.2, 1 and 1 are the
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two players' optimal stopping rules when their respective terminal times are 0 and
0. In the language of the xed point formulation, (1t ; 
1





1t _ 1t  0t ^ 0t = T . Assume
nt _ nt  n 1t ^ n 1t (3.1.65)
for n. Denote n+1t and 
n+1
t as their stopping rules that attain the superema in






h1(s; X; us; v














h2(s; X; us; v













t ) in the xed point language. There exists a pair of stopping rules (
n+1; n+1)
that attains the suprema in (3.1.66) and (3.1.67), by replacing the notations (0; 0)
with (n; n) and (1; 1) with (n+1; n+1) in Lemma 3.1.2. According to Lemma 3.1.2,
together with (3.1.9) and (3.1.19), for n = 1; 2;    , the processes Yn() 2 M2(2; 0;T ),
Zn() 2 L2(2  d; 0;T ), and Kn() continuous increasing inM2(2; 0;T ) satisfy
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
dYn1 (s) =   H1(s; X;Zn1(s); us; vs)ds + Zn1 (s)dBs   dKn1 (s)
=   h1(s; X; us; vs)ds + Zn1(s)dBu
;v






dYn2 (s) =   H2(s; X;Zn2(s); us; vs)ds + Zn2 (s)dBs   dKn2 (s)
=   h2(s; X; us; vs)ds + Zn2(s)dBu
;v
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t , then taking P
u;v expectations,


















n 1)   Kn1 (nt )
Fnt
#
Eu;v [U1(n 1t )jFnt ]  Eu



















t )   Kn2 (nt )
Fnt
#
Eu;v[U2(n 1t )jFnt ]  Eu
;v[U2(nt )jFnt ] = U2(nt ):
(3.1.69)
The rst pair of inequalities in the above two entries come from the nonnegativity
assumptions of h1 and h2, and the fact that K1();K2() are increasing processes, once
more with the help of the same localization technique in the proof of Theorem 3.1.1.
The second pair of inequalities come from the induction assumption nt _ nt  n 1t ^
n 1t , and the monotonicity assumption of U() in Assumption 3.1.2 (1). One can get
rid of conditional expectations as in the nal pair of equalities, because by Assumption
3.1.2 (1) the process U() is progressively measurable with respect to the ltration
fFtg0tT . But U1(nt ) = Yn+11 (nt ), and U2(nt ) = Yn+12 (nt ), hence Yn+11 (nt )  Yn1 (nt ),
and Yn+12 (
n
t )  Yn2 (nt ). By the comparison theorem (Theorem 3.2.2 and Theorem
3.3.3) in dimension one, Yn+11 (s)  Yn1 (s), for all t  s  nt , and Yn+12 (s)  Yn2 (s), for











 nt , where the stopping rules
 and  are dened in (3.1.24) and (3.1.25). Then Yn+1()  Yn() implies n+1t  nt ,
and n+1t  nt . Finally, we have nished the (n + 1)th step of mathematical induction
by concluding
n+1t _ n+1t  nt ^ nt : (3.1.70)
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The sequences fYn()gn, fnt gn and fnt gn from the induction are all decreasing, thus have
pointwise limits Y(), t and t .


























The inequalities in (3.1.71) become equalities, if t = nt , u = u
 and t = nt , v = v.
First taking corresponding conditional expectations of (3.1.71) with respect to Ft, the
stochastic integrals vanish still by the localization technique as in proof of Theorem
3.1.1. Then letting n ! 1, and using the equivalence between maximizing (3.1.59)
and maximizing (3.1.61), we arrive at






; v)jFt]  Eu;v[R1t (t; ; u; v)jFt], 8t 2 S (t;T ), 2 U ;






; v)jFt]  Eu;v[R1t (t ; t; u; v)jFt], 8t 2 S (t;T ), 2 V ;
(3.1.72)
with rewards R1 and R2 as in (3.1.59).
The inductive procedure produces a Nash equilibrium (; ; u; v) for Game 3.1.2.
The equilibrium controls (u; v) come from Isaacs' condition, Assumption 3.1.3. The
equilibrium stopping rules (; ) are the limits of the iterative sequence of optimal
stopping rules, thus provide a xed point of the mapping   dened in (3.1.62).
Theorem 3.1.2 Under Assumptions 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, if h is bounded from below,
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then the limit (; ; u; v) from the iteration is an equilibrium point of Game 3.1.2.
Remark 3.1.3 Game 3.1.2 always has a trivial equilibrium (t; t; 0; 0). The iterative
procedure in this section can be numerically implemented to determine if the limiting
equilibrium point (; ; u; v) is trivial or not.
3.2 A multidimensional reected BSDE with Lipschitz
growth
Starting from this section, we solve multidimensional BSDEs with reecting barriers,
the type of BSDEs associated with Game 3.1.1, and provide two useful properties of
the equations, the comparison theorem in dimension one and the theorem about contin-
uous dependence of the solution on the terminal values. The discussions on the BSDEs
are postponed until here, only to nish the game part rst. Proofs of results to be stated
from now on in this paper do not depend on any earlier arguments.
This section assumes the following the following Lipschitz growth condition and inte-
grability conditions on the parameters of the equations.
Assumption 3.2.1 (1) The driver g is a mapping g : [0;T ]Rmmd ! Rm, (t; y; z) 7!
g(t; y; z). For every xed y 2 Rm and z 2 Rmd, the process fg(t; y; z)g0tT is fFtg0tT -
predictable. For all t 2 [0;T ], g(t; y; z) is uniformly Lipschitz in y and z, i.e. there exists
a constant b > 0, such that
jg(t; y; z)   g(t; y¯; z¯)j  b(jjy   y¯jj + jjz   z¯jj); (3.2.1)
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(2) The random variable  isFT -measurable and square-integrable. The lower reect-








Also, L(T )  , a.e. on 
.
Under Assumption 3.2.1, this section proves existence and uniqueness of solution
(Y;Z;K) to the following BSDE
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:






Z(s)dBs + K(T )   K(t);
Y(t)  L(t), 0  t  T ,
Z T
0
(Y(t)   L(t))dK(t) = 0;
(3.2.4)
in the spaces
Y() = (Y1();    ;Ym())0 2 M2(m; 0;T )
=
(









Z() = (Z1();    ;Zm())0 2 L2(m  d; 0;T )
=
(








K() = (K1();    ;Km())0: continuous, increasing process inM2(m; 0;T );
(3.2.5)
where the positive integer m is the dimension of the equation. The backward equation
and the reecting condition in (3.2.4) should be interpreted component-wise. It means
that, for every i = 1;    ;m, in the ith dimension,
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:






Zi(s)dBs + Ki(T )   Ki(t);
Yi(t)  Li(t), 0  t  T ,
Z T
0
(Yi(t)   Li(t))dKi(t) = 0:
(3.2.6)
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The process Yi() is motivated by the Brownian noise B() as the fuel, whose amount
is determined by a control Zi(). The driver gi leads Yi() towards the nal desti-
nation i. Whenever the ith component Yi() drops to the lower reecting boundary
Li(), it receives a force Ki() that kicks it upwards. When Yi() stays above level Li(),
the force Ki() does not apply. The process Ki() stands for the minimum cumulative
exogenous energy required to keep Yi() above level Li(). The m equations compose a
system of m vehicles whose drivers track each other. For notational simplicity, the
vector form (3.2.4) is used as a shorthand.
Lemma 3.2.1 For any processes (Y0(); Z0()) 2 L2(m; 0;T )  L2(m  d; 0;T ), there
exist unique (Y1();Z1()) 2 M2(m; 0;T )  L2(m  d; 0;T ), and K1() 2 M2(m; 0;T ),
such that
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
dY1(t) =  g(t;Y0(t);Z0(t))dt + Z1(t)dBt   dK1(t), 0  t  T ;
Y1(T ) = ;
Y1(t)  L(t), 0  t  T,
Z T
0
(Y1(t)   L(t))dK1(t) = 0:
(3.2.7)
Proof. For any i = 1;    ;m, in the ith dimension, by Corollary 3.7 of El Karoui,
Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez (1997) [19], there exists a unique solution
(Y1i (); Z1i ()) 2 M2(1; 0;T )  L2(d; 0; T ), and a continuous, increasing process K1i () 2
M2(1; 0;T ), to the one-dimensional reected BSDE
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
dY1i (t) =  gi(t; Y0(t);Z0(t))dt + Z1i (t)dBt   dK1i (t), 0  t  T ;
Y1i (T ) = i;
Y1i (t)  Li(t), 0  t  T ,
Z T
0
(Y1i (t)   Li(t))dK1i (t) = 0:
(3.2.8)
The processes Y1() := (Y11 ();    ;Y1m())0, Z1() := (Z11();    ;Z1m())0, and K1() :=
(K11 ();    ;K1m())0 form the desired triplet. 
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To prove existence and uniqueness of the solution to the multi-dimensional BSDE
(3.2.4) with reecting barrier, it suces to show that the mapping




Theorem 3.2.1 The mapping  is a contraction from L2(m; 0;T )  L2(m  d; 0;T ) to
L2(m; 0; T )  L2(m  d; 0;T ).
















. We prove the contraction statement
under the norm jj  jj2;. Suppose (Y0();Z0()) and (Y¯0(); Z¯0()) are both inM2(m; 0;T )
L2(md; 0;T ). Denote (Y1();Z1()) = (Y0();Z0()) and (Y¯1(); Z¯1()) = (Y¯0(); Z¯0()).
Applying Ito's rule to et(Y1(t)   Y¯1(t))2, and integrating the derivative from t to T ,
et(Y1(t)   Y¯1(t))2 + 
Z T
t



















es(Y1(s)   Y¯1(s))(Z1(s)   Z¯1(s))dBs:
(3.2.10)
Because g is uniformly Lipschitz,
jg(s;Y0(s);Z0(s))   g(s; Y¯0(s); Z¯0(s))j  bjY0(s)   Y¯0(s)j + bjZ0(s)   Z¯0(s)j: (3.2.11)
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For every constant 1 > 0,
2es(Y1(s)   Y¯1(s))(g(s;Y0(s);Z0(s))   g(s; Y¯0(s); Z¯0(s)))
1es(Y1(s)   Y¯1(s))2 + 2b
2
1









es(Y1(s)   Y¯1(s))(Z1(s)   Z¯1(s))ds




Since, by denition of the mapping, Y1()  L(), and Y¯1()  L(), (Y1() L())dK1() =
(Y¯1()   L())dK¯1()  0, and K1() and K¯1() are increasing, we have,
Z T
t














Combining (3.2.10), (3.2.12), (3.2.13) and (3.2.14), letting t = 0, and taking expecta-
tion on both sides of the inequality,
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Because 1, 2 and  are arbitrary, we may let 1 = 8b2, 2 = 2, and  = 1 +2 + 12 =
8b2 + 52 , then from (3.2.15),
jjY1   Y¯1jj22; + jjZ1   Z¯1jj22; 
1
2
jjY0   Y¯0jj22; +
1
2
jjZ0   Z¯0jj22;: (3.2.16)
The mapping  is indeed a contraction. 
Proposition 3.2.1 The BSDE (3.2.4) with reecting barrier has a unique solution in
M2(m; 0;T )  L2(m  d; 0;T ).
Proof. The solution is the unique xed-point, say (Y();Z()), of the contraction .
Since (Y();Z()) 2 L2(m; 0;T )  L2(m  d; 0;T ), (Y();Z()) = (Y();Z()) is also in
M2(m; 0;T )  L2(m  d; 0;T ) by Lemma 3.2.1. 
Theorem 3.2.2 (Comparison Theorem, El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and
Quenez (1997) [19])
Suppose (Y;Z;K) solves (3.2.4) with parameter set (; g; L), and (Y¯ ; Z¯; K¯) solves (3.2.4)
with parameter set (¯; g¯; L¯). Let dimension of the equations be m = 1. Under Assump-
tion 3.2.1, except that the uniform Lipschitz condition only needed for either g or g¯, if
(1)   ¯, a.e.;
(2) g(t; y; z)  g¯(t; y; z), a.e. (t; !) 2 [0;T ] 
, 8(y; z) 2 R  Rd; and
(3) L(t)  L¯(t), a.e. (t; !) 2 [0;T ] 
,
then
Y(t)  Y¯(t), a.e. (t; !) 2 [0;T ] 
: (3.2.17)
Theorem 3.2.3 (Continuous Dependence Property)




Y¯(t) = ¯ +
Z T
t
g(s; Y¯(s); Z¯(s))ds  
Z T
t
Z¯(s)dBs + K¯(T )   K¯(t);
Y¯(t)  L(t), 0  t  T,
Z T
0
(Y¯(t)   L(t))dK¯(t) = 0;
(3.2.18)
then there exists a constant number C, such that for all 0  t  T,










+ E[(K(t)   K¯(t))2]
CE[(   ¯)2]:
(3.2.19)
Proof. Applying Ito's rule to et(Y(t) Y¯(t))2, integrating from t to T , and then repeating
the methods in proof of Theorem 3.2.1,
et(Y(t)   Y¯(t))2 + 
Z T
t




=eT (   ¯)2 + 2
Z T
t




es(Y(s)   Y¯(s))(Z(s)   Z¯(s))ds + 2
Z T
t




es(Y(s)   Y¯(s))(Z(s)   Z¯(s))dBs













es(Z(s)   Z¯(s))2ds + 2
Z T
t
es(Y(s)   Y¯(s))(Z(s)   Z¯(s))dBs:
(3.2.20)
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Rearranging the terms in (3.2.20), and taking expectations,




















In (3.2.21), letting 1 = 4b2, 2 = 4, and  = b + 1 + 2 + 12 = 4b
2 + b + 92 gives















eTE[(   ¯)2], for all 0  t  T:
(3.2.22)
Hence both












 2eTE[(   ¯)2] (3.2.24)
hold true.
It remains to estimate the L2-norm of (K(t)   K¯(t)). Integrating dY and dY¯ from 0 to t
gives








K¯(t) = Y¯(0)   Y¯(t)  
Z t
0
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(Y(0)   Y¯(0))2 + (Y(t)   Y¯(t))2 + t
Z t
0








Taking expectation on both sides of (3.2.27), by Lipschitz condition Assumption 3.2.1














4C1(Tb2 + 1)eTE[(   ¯)2];
(3.2.28)
last inequality from (3.2.23) and (3.2.24). 
3.3 Markovian system with linear growth rate
This section shows existence of the solution to the multidimensional BSDE with re-
ecting barrier within a Markovian framework. The growth rate of the forward equa-
tion is assumed polynomial in the state process X, and linear in both the value process
Y and the volatility process Z. The comparison theorem in dimension one and continu-
ous dependence property of the value process and the volatility process on the terminal
condition is also provided.
The Markovian system of forward-backward SDE's in question is the following pair of
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equations.
8>>>>><>>>>>:
Xt;x(s) = x, 0  s  t;
dXt;x(s) = f (s; Xt;x(s))ds + (s; Xt;x(s))dBs, t < s  T:
(3.3.1)
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Y t;x(s) =(Xt;x(T )) +
Z T
s




+ Kt;x(T )   Kt;x(s);
Y t;x(s) L(s; Xt;x(s)), t  s  T ,
Z T
t
(Y t;x(s)   L(s; Xt;x(s)))dKt;x(s) = 0:
(3.3.2)
For any x 2 Rl, the SDE (3.3.1) has a unique strong solution, under Assumption 3.3.1
(1) below (cf. page 287, Karatzas and Shreve (1988) [34]). A solution to the forward-
backward system (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) is a triplet of processes (Y t;x; Zt;x;Kt;x) satisfying
(3.3.2), where Y t;x 2 M2(m; 0;T ), Zt;x 2 L2(m  d; 0;T ), and Kt;x is a continuous,
increasing process inM2(m; 0; T ). The superscript (t; x) on X, Y , Z, and K indicates the
state x of the underlying process X at time t. It will be omitted for notational simplicity.
Assumption 3.3.1 (1) In (3.3.1), the drift f : [0;T ]  Rl ! Rl, and volatility  :
[0;T ]Rl ! Rld, are deterministic, measurable mappings, locally Lipschitz in x uni-
formly over all t 2 [0;T ]. And for all (t; x) 2 [0;T ]Rl, j f (t; x)j2+j(t; x)j2  C(1+jxj2),
for some constant C.
(2) In (3.3.2), the driver g is a deterministic measurable mapping g : [0;T ]  Rl 
Rmmd ! Rm, (t; x; y; z) 7! g(t; x; y; z). And for all (t; x; y; z) 2 [0;T ]RlRmRmd,
jg(t; x; y; z)j  b(1 + jxjp + jyj + jzj), for some positive constant b.
(3) For every xed (t; x) 2 [0;T ]  Rl, the mapping g(t; x; ; ) is continuous.
(4) The terminal value  : Rl ! Rm, x 7! (x), is a deterministic measurable map-
ping. The lower reecting boundary L : [0;T ]  Rl ! Rm, (s; x) 7! L(s; x) is de-







< 1, and L(T; X(T ))  (X(T )), a.e. on 
.
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Theorem 3.3.1 Suppose that Assumption 3.3.1 holds, except the growth rate condition
on g. If the driver g(s; x; y; z) in the reected BSDE (3.3.2) is Lipschitz in y and z,
uniformly over all s 2 [0;T ] and all x 2 Rl, then there exist measurable deterministic
functions  : [0; T ]  Rl ! Rm, and  : [0;T ]  Rl ! Rmd, such that for any
0  t  s  T, Y t;x(s) = (s; Xt;x(s)), and Zt;x(s) = (s; Xt;x(s)). The solutions to the
BSDE are functions of the state process X.
Proof. (by ShiGe Peng) First, the one-dimensional casem = 1. There exist measurable,
deterministic functions an : [0;T ]  Rl ! R, bn : [0;T ]  Rl ! Rd, such that for any
0  t  s  T , the solution (Y (t;x);n;Z(t;x);n) to the penalized equation
Y (t;x);n(s) =(Xt;x(T )) +
Z T
s







(Y (t;x);n(r)   L(r; Xt;x(r))) dr
(3.3.3)
can be expressed as Y (t;x);n(s) = an(s; Xt;x(s)), and Z(t;x);n(s) = bn(s; Xt;x(s)); in par-
ticular, Y (t;x);n(t) = an(t; x). This is the Markovian property of solutions to one one-
dimensional forward-backward SDE's with Lipschitz driver, stated as Theorem 4.1 in
El Karoui, Peng and Quenez (1997) [20]. Their proof uses the Picard iteration and the
Markov property of the iterated sequence of solutions, the latter being an interpretation
of Theorem 6.27 on page 206 of C¸inlar, Jacod, Protter and Sharpe (1980) [9]. Analyzed
in section 6, El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez (1997) [19], its solu-
tion (Y (t;x);n;Z(t;x);n) converges to some limit (Y t;x; Zt;x) inM2(m; t;T )  L2(m  d; t;T ).
The penalization term n
R s
0 (Y
(t;x);n(r)   L(r; Xt;x(r))) dr also has an M2(m; 0;T )-limit
Kt;x(s). The triplet (Y t;x;Zt;x;Kt;x) solves the system (3.3.1) and (3.3.2). But the con-
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vergences are also almost everywhere on 
  [t;T ], so
Y t;x(s) = lim
n!1Y
(t;x);n(s) = lim sup
n!1
(an(s; Xt;x(s))) = lim sup
n!1





(t;x);n(s) = lim sup
n!1
(bn(s; Xt;x(s))) = lim sup
n!1
(bn)(s; Xt;x(s)) =: b(s; Xt;x(s)):
(3.3.5)
Back to a general dimension m. By Theorem 3.2.1 and Proposition 3.2.1, the sequence
(Yn+1;Zn+1) = (Yn;Zn), n = 0; 1; 2;    , iterated via the mapping  as in (3.2.1),
converges to (Y;Z) a.e. on
[t;T ] and inM2(m; 0;T )L2(md; 0;T ). If one can prove
Y1(s) and Z1(s) are functions of (s; X(s)), so is every (Yn(s); Zn(s)) by induction. Then
the theorem holds, because (Y;Z) is the pointwise limit of f(Yn(s);Zn(s))gn. The claim
is indeed true. Starting with Y (t;x);0(s) = 0(s; X(s)), and Z(t;x);0(s) = 0(s; X(s)), for any
measurable, deterministic functions 0 : [0; T ]Rl ! Rm, and 0 : [0; T ]Rl ! Rmd
satisfying 0(; Xt;x()) 2 M2(m; 0;T ), and 0(; Xt;x()) 2 L2(md; 0;T ). In an arbitrary










Z1i (r)dBr + K
1
i (T )   K1i (s);
Y1i (s) Li(s; Xt;x(s)), t  s  T ,
Z T
t
(Y1i (s)   Li(s; Xt;x(s)))dK1i (s) = 0:
(3.3.6)
From the one-dimensional result, there exist measurable, deterministic functions 1i :
[0;T ]  Rl ! R, and 1i : [0;T ]  Rl ! Rd, such that Y (t;x);1i (s) = 1i (s; Xt;x(s)),
and Z(t;x);1i (s) = 
1
i (s; X
t;x(s)), for all 0  t  s  T . Let 1 = (11;    ; 1m)0, and
1 = (11;    ; 1m)0, then Y (t;x);1(s) = 1(s; Xt;x(s)), and Z(t;x);1(s) = 1(s; Xt;x(s)), for all
0  t  s  T . 
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Remark 3.3.1 To prove the above theorem, besides using the notion of additive mar-
tingales as in C¸inlar et al (1980) [9], the two deterministic functions can also be
obtained by solving a multi-dimensional variational inequality following the four-step-
scheme proposed by Ma, Protter and Yong (1994) [42].
The rest of this section will be devoted to proving existence of solutions to the reected
forward-backward system (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) under the Assumption 3.3.1. We shall
construct a specic sequence of Lipschitz drivers gn to approximate the linear-growth
driver g. The corresponding sequence of solutions will turn out to converge to the sys-
tem (3.3.1) and (3.3.2). We then approximate the continuous linear growth driver g by
a sequence of Lipschitz functions gn.
Let  ¯ be an innitely dierentiable mapping from Rm  Rmd to R, such that
 ¯(y; z) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1, jyj2 + jzj2  1;
0, jyj2 + jzj2  4;
(3.3.7)
and  a rescaling of  ¯ by a multiplicative constant such that
Z
RmRmd
 (y; z)dydz = 1: (3.3.8)
The function  is a kernel conventionally used to smooth out non-dierentiability, for
example, by Karatzas and Ocone (1992) [33], or to approximate functions of higher
growth rate, for example, by Hamadene, Lepeltier and Peng (1997) [26].
The approximating sequence gn is dened as








g(t; x; y1; z1) ¯(n(y   y1); n(z   z1))dy1dz1: (3.3.9)
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According to Hamadene, Lepeltier and Peng (1997) [26], the sequence of functions gn
has the properties:
(a) gn is Lipschitz with respect to (y; z), uniformly over all (t; x) 2 [0;T ]  Rl;
(b) jgn(t; x; y; z)j  b(1 + jxjp + jyj + jzj), for all (t; x; y; z) 2 [0; T ]  Rl  Rm  Rmd, for
some positive constant b;
(c) jgn(t; x; y; z)j  bn(1 + jxjp), for all (t; x; y; z) 2 [0;T ]  Rl  Rm  Rmd, for some
positive constant bn;
(d) for any (t; x) 2 [0;T ]  R, and for any compact set S  Rm  Rmd,
sup
(y;z)2S
jgn(t; x; y; z)   g(t; x; y; z)j ! 0, as n ! 0: (3.3.10)
Proposition 3.3.1 The BSDE with reecting barrier
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:






Zn(r)dBr + Kn(T )   Kn(s);
Yn(s)  L(s; X(s)), t  s  T,
Z T
t
(Yn(s)   L(s; X(s)))dKn(s) = 0
(3.3.11)
has a unique solution (Yn;Zn;Kn). Furthermore, there exist measurable, deterministic
functions n and n, such that Yn(s) = n(s; X(s)), and Zn(s) = n(s; X(s)), for all
0  s  T.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the uniform Lipschitz property of gn, Proposition
3.2.1 and Theorem 3.3.1. 
Lemma 3.3.1 Suppose (Y;Z;K) solves the BSDE (3.3.2) with reecting barrier. As-









Z(r)2ds + K(T )2
#
 C(1 + jxj2(p_1)): (3.3.12)
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Z(r)2ds + K(T )2
#
 C0(1 + jxj2(p_1)), for all 0  s  T: (3.3.13)





=(X(T ))2 + 2
Z T
s

















E[(X(T ))2] + 2bE
" Z T
s










































K(T )  1
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If rewriting (3.3.2) from t to T , K() can be expressed in terms of Y() and Z() by
K(T ) = Y(t)   (X(T ))  
Z T
t




and hence because of the linear growth Assumption 3.3.1 (2), we have
E[K(T )2] = C3E
"

































in (3.3.19) by (3.3.17),




















Let  = 4C5(b; t;T ), and collect E[K(T )2] terms on both sides of (3.3.20),
E[K(T )2]  C6(b; t;T )E
"
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 C8(1 + jxj2p): (3.3.23)



















To bound the L2 supremum norm of Y(), taking rst supremum over s 2 [0;T ] then
expectation, on both sides of (3.3.14), using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, and












































































































Inequalities (3.3.13), (3.3.23) and (3.3.26) conclude the lemma. 
Proposition 3.3.2 There exists a positive constant C, such that for 0  t  T, n =
1; 2;    ,
n(t; x) = Y (t;x);n(t) = E[Y (t;x);n(t)jFt]  C(1 + jxjp_1): (3.3.27)
Proposition 3.3.3 The sequence fgn(; X();Yn();Zn())gn is uniformly bounded in the
L2(m; t;T )-norm, and the sequence fKn()gn is uniformly bounded in the M2(m; t;T )-
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norm, both uniformly over all n. As n ! 1, gn(; X();Yn();Zn()) weakly converges
to some limit G() in L2(m; t;T ) along a subsequence, and Kn() weakly converges to
some limit K() inM2(m; t;T ) along a subsequence, for every s 2 [t; T ].
Proof. It suces to show the uniform boundedness of fgn(; X();Yn();Zn())gn in
L2(m; t;T ) and of fKn(T )gn in L2(m), which is a result of the linear growth property (b)
and Lemma 3.3.1. The L2(m) uniform boundedness of fKn(T )gn means that there exists
a constantC < 1, such that E[jKn(T )j2] < C. Since Kn() is required to be an increasing
process starting from Kn(t) = 0, then for all t  s  T , E[jKn(s)j2]  E[jKn(T )j2] < C.

With the help of weak convergence along a subsequence, we proceed to argue that
the weak limits are also strong, thus deriving a solution to BSDE (3.3.2). For no-
tational simplicity, the weakly convergent subsequences are still indexed by n. The
passing from weak to strong convergence makes use of the Markovian structure of the
system described by Theorem 3.3.1, which states that the valued process Yn(s) is a
deterministic function of time s and state process X(s) only.
Lemma 3.3.2 The approximating sequence of solutions f(Y (t;x);n;Z(t;x);n)gn is Cauchy in
L2(m; t;T )L2(md; t; T ), thus having a limit (Y t;x;Zt;x) in L2(m; t; T )L2(md; t;T )
and a.e. on [t;T ] 
.
Proof. For any t 2 [0;T ], any x 2 Rl, and any n = 1; 2;    , Y (t;x);n(t) = n(t; x) is
deterministic. First prove the convergence of fn(t; x)gn by showing it is Cauchy. From
equation (3.3.11) comes the following inequality,





(gn(s; X(s);Yn(s); Zn(s))   gk(s; X(s);Yk(s);Zk(s)))ds
#
+ jE[Kn(T )   Kk(T )]j + jE[Kn(t)   Kk(t)]j:
(3.3.28)
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By the weak convergence from Proposition 3.3.3, all the three summands on the right
hand side of the above inequality converge to zero, as n and k both go to innity. Denote
the limit of n(t; x) as (t; x), which is consequently deterministic and measurable,
because n(; ) is measurable. Theorem 3.3.1 states that for any t  s  T , Y (t;x);n(s) =
n(s; Xt;x(s)). Because of the pointwise convergence of n(; ), Y (t;x);n(s) converges to
some Y (t;x)(s), a.e. (s; !) 2 [t;T ]  
, as n ! 1. Proposition 3.3.2 states that there
exists a positive constant C, such that for 0  t  T , n = 1; 2;    ,
jY (t;x);n(s)j = jn(s; Xt;xs )j  C(1 + jXt;xs jp_1); (3.3.29)
the last term of which is square-integrable by (3.3.23). Then it follows from the domi-
nated convergence theorem that the convergence of Y (t;x);n(s) is also in L2(m; t;T ).
Apply Ito's rule to (Y (t;x);n(s)   Y (t;x);k(s))2, and integrate from s to T . The reecting
conditions that leads to the inequality (3.2.14) gives











(Yn(r)   Yk(r))(Zn(r)   Zk(r))dBr:
(3.3.30)
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Taking expectation of (3.3.30),






























, for all n, which is part of Proposition 3.3.3. The
L2(m d; t;T )-convergence of fZn()gn implies almost sure convergence along a subse-
quence, also denoted as fZn()gn to simplify notations. 
We have identied a strongly convergent subsequence of f(Yn;Zn)gn, also denoted as
f(Yn;Zn)gn. Let's remind ourselves that (Yn;Zn) solves the system (3.3.1) and (3.3.11),
so if the weak limitG() of gn(; X();Yn();Zn()) is also the strong limit, and ifG() has
the form g(; X(); Y();Z()), then the limit (Y;Z;K) indeed solves the forward-backward
system (3.3.1) and (3.3.2).
Lemma 3.3.3 As n ! 1, gn(s; X(s);Yn(s); Zn(s)) ! g(s; X(s);Y(s);Z(s)), in L2(m; t;T )
and a.e. on [t;T ] 
.
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Proof. The method is the same as that on page 122 of Hamadene, Lepeltier and Peng























By linear growth Assumption 3.3.1 (2) for g and property (b) for gn, and Lemma 3.3.1,
both jgn(s; X(s);Yn(s);Zn(s))   g(s; X(s);Yn(s);Zn(s))j and jg(s; X(s);Yn(s);Zn(s))  
g(s; X(s);Y(s);Z(s))j are uniformly bounded in L2(m; 0;T ) for all n. The rst term
on the right hand side of (3.3.32) is at most of the order 1A , thus vanishing as A goes
to innity. Recalling property (d), for xed A, the second term vanishes as n ! 1.
Because of its uniform boundedness in L2(m; t;T ), the integrand in the third term is
uniformly integrable for all n, so expectation of the integral again goes to 0 as n ! 1.
The a.e. convergent subsequence of gn(s; X(s); Yn(s);Zn(s)) is also indexed by n to
simplify notations. 
Proposition 3.3.4 The L2(m; t; T ) convergence and the a.e. convergence of fY (t;x);n(s)gn
to Y (t;x)(s) are uniform over all s 2 [t;T ].
Proof. To see uniform convergence of fYng, applying Ito's rule to (Yn(s)   Y(s))2,
integrating from s to T , taking supremum over 0  s  T and then expectation, by


















































































































By Proposition 3.3.3, by linear growth properties (b) of gn and Assumption 3.3.1 (2)
on g, and by Lemma 3.3.1, the second multiplier on the right hand side of (3.3.34) is
bounded by a constant, uniformly over all n. By Lemma 3.3.2, the rst multiplier on
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Proposition 3.3.5 The process Kn() converges to some limit K() in M1(m; t;T ), uni-
formly over all s 2 [t;T ], and a.e. on [t;T ] 
.
Proof. Dene
K¯(s) := Y(t)   Y(s)  
Z s
t
g(r; X(r);Y(r); Z(r))dr +
Z s
t
Z(r)dBr, t  s  T; (3.3.36)
where Y(), Z() and g are the limits of Yn(), Zn() and gn. From (3.3.11),












Kn(s)   K¯(s) # ! 0; (3.3.38)
as n ! 1.
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As n ! 1, the rst three summands in (3.3.39) go to zero, by Lemma 3.3.2, Proposi-
tion 3.3.4 and Lemma 3.3.3. From Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, there exists a















the right hand side of which converges to zero as n ! 1, by Lemma 3.3.2.
The a.e. convergent subsequence is still denoted as fKn()gn to simplify notations. The
strong limit K¯() coincides with the weak limit K() in Proposition 3.3.3. 
Proposition 3.3.6 The processes Y() and K() satisfy the reection conditions Y() 
L(; X()) and R Tt (Y(s)   L(s; X(s)))dK(s) = 0.
Proof. Since (Yn;Zn;Kn) solves (3.3.11), Yn() and Kn() satisfy the reecting condi-
tions Yn(s)  L(s; X(s)), t  s  T , and R Tt (Yn(s)   L(s; X(s)))dKn(s) = 0. Since Yn()
converges to Y() pointwisely on [0;T ] 




(Y(s)   L(s; X(s)))dK(s) =
Z T
t





(Yn(s)   L(s; X(s)))dKn(s)  
Z T
t











(Y(s)   L(s; X(s)))d(K(s)   Kn(s))







(Y(s)   L(s; X(s)))d(K(s)   Kn(s))
 :
(3.3.42)
Let n tend to zero. By Proposition 3.3.4, the rst summand in the last line of (3.3.42)
converges to j0  K(T )j = 0, a.e. on 
. Proposition 3.3.5 implies that Kn(s) converges
to K(s) in probability, uniformly over all s 2 [t;T ], so the measure dKn(s) weakly con-
126 CHAPTER 3. BSDE APPROACH
verges to dK(s) in probability, uniformly over all s 2 [t;T ]. It follows that the second
summand in the last line of (3.3.42) converges to zero, a.e. on 
. 
We may now conclude the following existence result.
Theorem 3.3.2 Under Assumption 3.3.1, there exists a solution (Y;Z;K) to the BSDE
(3.3.2) with reecting barrier in the Markovian framework.
Proof. The solutions f(Yn;Zn;Kn)gn to the approximating equations (3.3.11) have limits
(Y;Z;K). The triplet (Y;Z;K) is a solution to the Markovian system (3.3.1) and (3.3.2).

Theorem 3.3.3 (Comparison Theorem)
Suppose (Y t;x;Zt;x;Kt;x) solves forward-backward system (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) with pa-
rameter set (; g; L), and (Y¯ t;x; Z¯t;x; K¯t;x) solves the forward-backward system (3.3.1)
and (3.3.2) with parameter set (¯; g¯; L¯). Let dimension of the equations be m = 1. Un-
der Assumption 3.3.1 for both sets of parameters, if
(1) (x)  ¯(x), a.e., 8x 2 Rl;
(2) g(s; x; y; z)  g¯(s; x; y; z), for all t  s  T, and all (x; y; z) 2 Rl  R  Rd; and
(3) L(s; x)  L¯(s; x), for all t  s  T, and all x 2 Rl,
then
Y t;x(s)  Y¯ t;x(s), for all t  s  T: (3.3.43)
Proof. Let fgngn and fg¯ngn be, respectively, the uniform Lipschitz sequences approxi-
mating g and g¯ as in (3.3.9). According to Property (a), both gn and g¯n are Lipschitz in
(y; z), for all t and x. We notice that (2) in the conditions of this theorem implies that
gn(s; x; y; z)  g¯n(s; x; y; z); (3.3.44)
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for all t  s  T , and all (x; y; z) 2 Rl  Rm  Rmd, via construction (3.3.9). Let
(Y (t;x);n;Z(t;x);n;K(t;x);n) be solution to system (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) with parameter set
(; gn; L), and (Y¯ (t;x);n; Z¯(t;x);n; K¯(t;x);n) be solution to system (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) with pa-
rameter set (¯; g¯n; L¯). By Theorem 3.2.2,
Y (t;x);n(s)  Y¯ (t;x);n(s), t  s  T: (3.3.45)
But as n ! 1, proven earlier in this section,
Y (t;x);n() ! Y t;x(), Y¯ (t;x);n() ! Y¯ t;x(), a.e. on [t;T ] 
 and in L2(m; t;T ); (3.3.46)
so
Y t;x(s)  Y¯ t;x(s), t  s  T: (3.3.47)

Theorem 3.3.4 (Continuous Dependence Property)
Under Assumption 3.3.1, if (Y t;x;Zt;x;Kt;x) solves the system (3.3.1) and (3.3.2), and
(Y¯ t;x; Z¯t;x; K¯t;x) solves the system (3.3.1) and
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Y¯ t;x(s) =¯(Xt;x(T )) +
Z T
s




+ K¯t;x(T )   K¯t;x(s);
Y¯ t;x(s) L(s; Xt;x(s)), t  s  T,
Z T
t
(Y¯ t;x(s)   L(s; Xt;x(s)))dK¯t;x(s) = 0;
(3.3.48)
then





E[j   ¯j2] +CE
" Z T
s
(Y t;x(r)   Y¯ t;x(r))2dr
# 1
2
, 0  t  s  T:
(3.3.49)
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Proof. Apply Ito's rule to (Y t;x   Y¯ t;x)2, and integrate from s to T . Use Lemma 3.3.1
and Assumption 3.3.1 (2). 
Remark 3.3.2 When the driver g is concerned about in Assumption 3.3.1, 3.3.1 (2)
(linear growth rates in y and z, and polynomial growth rate in x) is crucial in bounding
the L2-norms thus proving convergence of a Lipschitz approximating sequence. Conti-
nuity Assumption 3.3.1 (3) is only for convenience, because a measurable function can
always be approximated by continuous functions of the same growth rate.
Remark 3.3.3 The results in section 3.2 and section 3.3 are valid for any arbitrary
ltered probability space that can support a d-dimensional Brownian motion. In par-
ticular, in the canonical space set up at the beginning of section 3.1, we may replace
Assumption 3.3.1 (1) and (2) with the more general Assumption 3.3.1 (1') and (2'),
while still getting exactly the same statements in section 3.3 with tiny modications of
the proofs. Assumption 3.3.1 corresponds to Assumption 3.1.1 on the state process X()
in (3.1.3). The growth rate (3.1.49) of the Hamiltonians (3.1.48) satises Assumption
3.3.1 (2').
Assumption 3.3.1 (1') In (3.3.1), the drift f : [0; T ]  Cl[0;1) ! Rl, (t; !) 7!
f (t; !(t)), and volatility  : [0;T ]  Cl[0;1) ! Rld, (t; !) 7! (t; !(t)), are de-
terministic, measurable mappings such that
j f (t; !(t))   f (t; !¯(t))j + j(t; !(t))   (t; !¯(t))j  C sup
0st
j!(s)   !¯(s)j; (3.3.50)
and







with some constant C for all 0  t  T, ! and !¯ in Cl[0;1).
(2') In (3.3.2), the driver g is a deterministic measurable mapping g : [0;T ]Cl[0;1)
3.3. MARKOVIAN SYSTEM WITH LINEAR GROWTH RATE 129
Rm  Rmd ! Rm, (t; !; y; z) 7! g(t; !(t); y; z). And




j!(s)jp + jyj + jzj
!
; (3.3.52)
with some positive constant b for all (t; !; y; z) 2 [0;T ] Cl[0;1)  Rm  Rmd.
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